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Abstract 
Statistical analyses of the pipe-related incident data for onshore gas transmission 
pipelines between 2002 and 2013 collected by the Pipeline and Hazardous Material 
Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the United States Department of Transportation 
(DOT) are conducted.  It is found that the total length of the onshore gas transmission 
pipelines in the US is approximately 480,000 km as of 2013.  The third-party 
interference, external corrosion, material failure and internal corrosion are the leading 
causes for the pipe-related incidents, responsible for over 75% of the total incidents 
between 2002 and 2013.  Based on the pipeline mileage and incident data, the average 
rate of rupture incidents over the 12-year period between 2002 and 2013 is calculated to 
be 3.1 × 10-5 per km per year.  Furthermore, external corrosion is found to be the leading 
cause for rupture incidents, with a corresponding rupture rate of 1.0 × 10-5 per km per 
year.  
A log-logistic model is developed to evaluate the probability of ignition (POI) given a 
rupture of an onshore gas transmission pipeline using the maximum likelihood method 
based on a total of 188 rupture incidents between 2002 and 2014 collected from the 
PHMSA pipeline incident database.  The product of the pipeline internal pressure at the 
time of incident and outside diameter squared is observed to be strongly correlated to POI 
while the location class of the pipeline is not, and thus the former is adopted as the sole 
predictor in the model.  The 95% confidence interval is evaluated, and for practical 
engineering use, the 95% upper confidence bound is tabulated in a look-up table.  The 
proposed model is further validated using an independent dataset reported in the 
literature.   
The quantitative risk assessment of a hypothetical onshore gas transmission pipelines is 
illustrated by incorporating the statistics of the pipeline rupture incidents and POI model 
obtained in the present study.  The thermal radiation hazards resulting from an ignited 
rupture of the pipeline are quantified using the well-known C-FER model.  The heat 
intensity thresholds leading to fatality and injury for both the outdoor and indoor 
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exposure conditions are selected from the literature.  The societal risk is then evaluated in 
terms of the expected number of casualties and F-N curve for the population located in 
the vicinity of the pipeline, whereas the individual risk is calculated as the annual 
probability of casualty of a specific individual located in the vicinity of the pipeline.  The 
F-N curve is evaluated for each one kilometer section of the pipeline such that the section 
corresponding to the most critical F-N curve is identified.   
Keywords 
Onshore gas transmission pipeline; Pipeline incident; Rupture; Probability of ignition; 
Maximum likelihood method; Quantitative risk assessment; Societal risk, and Individual 
risk 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Transmission pipelines are the safest and most effective way to transport a large volume 
of natural gas over a long distance.  There are approximately 78,000 and 480,000 km gas 
transmission pipelines in Canada and the United States, respectively.  Although rare, 
pipeline incidents do occur due to various causes such as the third-party excavation 
activities, corrosion, material failure, ground movement and incorrect operation.  In many 
jurisdictions around the world, pipeline operators are required to report pipeline incidents 
to regulatory agencies (Golub et al. 1996; Kiefner et al. 2001; EGIG 2014).  These 
historical pipeline failure incidents provide valuable information about the leading causes 
for pipeline failures, typical failure modes, failure rate in terms of per year per unit 
length, consequences of failures, etc.  Such information will facilitate the development of 
effective pipeline integrity management programs and provide baseline statistics for the 
quantitative risk assessment of pipelines.  Since 1970, the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the United States Department of 
Transportation (DOT) has collected detailed information about incidents that occurred on 
oil and gas pipelines regulated by PHMSA and met certain incident reporting criteria.  
The PHMSA pipeline incident data are accessible to the general public at 
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/data-stats.  The PHMSA incident data for gas 
transmission pipelines between 1970 and 1993 were analyzed by Golub et al. (1996).  
Kiefner et al. (2001) analyzed the PHMSA incident data for gas transmission and 
gathering pipelines between 1985 and 1997.  However, analyses of the more recent 
PHMSA incident data have not been reported in the literature.  An ignited full-bore 
rupture of a natural gas transmission pipeline can have enormously severe consequences 
in terms of the human safety and property damage (Nessim et al. 2009; Zhou and Nessim 
2011).  To quantitatively evaluate the risk associated with a given gas pipeline, it is 
therefore critically important to evaluate the probability of ignition (POI) of the pipeline 
given rupture.  The ignition/non-ignition information included in the historical pipeline 
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failure incident data provides an opportunity to identify key pipeline attributes that 
impact POI and subsequently develop an appropriate POI model.   
1.2 Objective and Scope 
The study reported in this thesis is part of a Collaborative Research and Development 
(CRD) program funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council 
(NSERC) of Canada and TransCanada Pipelines Limited.  The objectives of this study 
are to 1) carry out statistical analyses of the PHMSA onshore gas transmission pipeline 
incident data to gain insights into the current state of onshore gas transmission pipelines 
in the US and develop relevant failure rate statistics that can be employed as the baseline 
failure probabilities for carrying out system-wide risk assessments of pipelines; 2) 
propose a POI model for ruptures of onshore gas transmission pipelines based on the 
corresponding PHMSA incident data to facilitate the quantitative risk assessment of gas 
pipelines, and 3) illustrate the application of outcomes of tasks 1) and 2) through the 
quantitative risk assessment of a hypothetical gas pipeline example.   
The three main topics of this study are presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  
Chapter 2 presents the statistical analyses of the mileage and pipe-related incident data 
for onshore gas transmission pipelines based on the PHMSA database between 2002 and 
2013.  The PHMSA data were analyzed to obtain the breakdowns of the overall pipeline 
mileage and incidents by different pipeline attributes.  Chapter 3 presents the 
development of the POI model for ruptures of onshore gas transmission pipelines.  The 
log-logistic POI model is developed based on the PHMSA incident data between 2002 
and 2014 using the maximum likelihood method.  In Chapter 4, quantitative risk 
assessments of a hypothetical onshore gas transmission pipeline is carried out to evaluate 
the societal and individual risk levels associated with ruptures of the pipeline, based on 
the failure statistics and POI model obtained in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively.  
1.3 Thesis Format 
This thesis is prepared in an Integrated-Article Format as specified by the School of 
Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies at the University of Western Ontario, London ON, 
  
3 
 
Canada.  A total of five chapters are included in the thesis.  Chapter 1 gives a brief 
introduction of the background, objective and scope of the study.  The main body of the 
thesis includes Chapters 2, 3, and 4, each of which is presented in an integrated-article 
format without an abstract, but with its own references.  Chapter 5 presents the summary 
and conclusions of this thesis, and recommendations for future study.   
References 
EGIG 2014. Gas pipeline incidents: 9th report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident 
Data Group (period 1970 – 2013). EGIG 14.R.0403, European Gas Pipeline Incident 
Data Group, NL – 9700 Ma Groningen. 
Golub, E., Greenfeld, J., Dresnack, R., Griffis, F.H. and Pignataro, L.J. 1996. Pipeline 
accident effects for natural gas transmission pipelines. DTRS 56-94-C-0006, National 
Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. 
Kiefner, J.F., Mesloh, R.E. and Kiefner, B.A. 2001. Analysis of DOT reportable 
incidents for gas transmission and gathering system pipelines, 1985 through 1997. 
L51830e, Technical Toolboxes, Inc., Houston, Texas 77098. 
Nessim, M.A., Zhou, W., Zhou, J. and Rothwell, B. (2009).  Target reliability levels 
for design and assessment of onshore natural gas pipelines.  Journal of Pressure Vessel 
Technology, ASME, 131(12), 061701, 1-12.   
Zhou, W., and Nessim, M.A. 2011. Optimal design of onshore natural gas pipelines. 
Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, 133(3): 031702. 
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Chapter 2  
Statistical Analyses of Incidents on Onshore Gas 
Transmission Pipelines Based on PHMSA Database 
2.1 Introduction 
Since 1970, the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) within 
the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) has collected information on 
incidents that occurred on gas and liquid pipelines regulated by PHMSA and met 
established reporting criteria.  It is noted that incident is synonymous with failure in the 
context of this study.  PHMSA's pipeline incident report includes information such as the 
location, cause and consequences of the incident as well as the basic attributes (e.g. 
diameter, wall thickness, steel grade, operating pressure etc.) of the pipeline involved in 
the incident.  The incident data can be accessed from 
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/data-stats.  In addition to the incident data, 
PHMSA also collects annual reports from gas and liquid pipeline operators that contain 
general information such as the total pipeline mileage, transported commodities, mileage 
by material and installation dates.  The pipeline incident and mileage data provide 
valuable information for researchers and industry professionals to identify major threats 
to the structural integrity of oil and gas pipelines, carry out system-wide risk assessments 
and develop effective risk mitigation strategies.  The study reported in this chapter was 
focused on the PHMSA incident and mileage data associated with the onshore (as 
opposed to offshore) gas transmission (as opposed to gathering) pipelines, which account 
for the vast majority of gas pipelines in the US.   
Golub et al. (1996) analyzed the PHMSA incident data on the gas transmission pipelines 
between 1970 and 1993.  They found that the primary causes of incidents were the 
outside force, construction-material defect and corrosion, responsible for 40.89, 27.65 
and 17.90% of all incidents, respectively.  Only incident rates due to corrosion were 
estimated, which are 0.14, 0.59, 0.17 and 0.40 per 1000 miles per year (i.e. 8.70×10-5, 
3.67×10-4, 1.06×10-4 and 2.49×10-4 per km per year) for coated, uncoated, cathodically 
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protected and unprotected pipes, respectively.  They identified that outside force 
incidents were primarily due to inadequate depth of cover and that larger pipe wall 
thickness led to better pipeline safety and reduced incident rates.  It was observed that the 
electric resistance welded pipes installed in the 1940s and 1970s had high rates of 
material failure.   
Kiefner et al. (2001) analyzed the incidents on the gas transmission and gathering 
pipelines from 1985 to 1997 as reported in the PHMSA database.  The primary causes for 
incidents were identified as the third-party damage, internal corrosion and external 
corrosion, responsible for 28.4%, 12.0% and 10.1% of all incidents, respectively.  The 
authors also examined the variation of the number of incidents due to different failure 
causes with time.  For example, the number of incidents due to the third-party damage 
generally decreased with time, which was partly attributed to the increasing use of the 
one-call system.  The number of leaks was found to decrease with time, probably due to 
the growing use of the in-line inspection.  Kiefner et al. further evaluated the incident 
rates (per mile per year) due to the third-party damage and external corrosion using the 
incident and mileage data.  For example, the incident rate due to the third-party damage 
for pipelines with outside diameters less than 4 inches was evaluated to be 1.01×10-4 per 
mile per year (i.e. 6.28×10-5 per km per year), and the incident rate due to external 
corrosion for coated cathodically protected pipelines was calculated to be 1.56×10-5 per 
mile per year (i.e. 9.69×10-6 per km per year).     
More pipeline incident and mileage data have been added to the PHMSA database since 
the completion of the aforementioned studies, which are close to two decade old.  
Therefore, it is desirable to carry out analyses of the up-to-date PHMSA database to gain 
insights into the current state of gas transmission pipelines in the US and develop relevant 
failure statistics that can serve as the baseline failure probabilities for carrying out 
system-wide risk assessments of pipelines.  This is the objective of the study reported in 
this chapter.  
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The PHMSA database is updated on an annual basis.  At the time of this study, the 
PHMSA database for the onshore gas transmission pipelines includes the incident data, 
from 1970 to 2014, and the mileage data from 1970 to 2013.  The present study analyzed 
the incident and mileage data from 2002 to 2013.  The 2014 incident data were excluded 
because the corresponding mileage data were unavailable; therefore, it was not feasible to 
evaluate the incident rates for 2014.  The pre-2002 data were excluded from the study 
because the information included in the data is much less detailed than that included in 
the post-2002 incident data as discussed in Section 2.3.2, which makes it very difficult to 
combine the data in these two periods together for analysis.  Furthermore, the breakdown 
of the post-2002 pipeline mileage data by the pipeline attributes (e.g. diameter, year of 
installation, location class, etc.) is more detailed than that of the pre-2002 mileage data, 
allowing more refined evaluations of incident rates by pipeline attributes.  Finally, the 
incident and mileage data between 2002 and 2013 are considered reasonably 
representative of the current state of onshore gas transmission pipelines in the US. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 presents the pipeline mileage 
data to provide an overview of the onshore gas transmission pipeline networks in the US 
and put the incident data described in Section 2.3 into perspective.  The rupture rate 
analyses using both the incident and mileage data are included in Section 2.4.  Section 2.5 
summarizes the main findings of the study. 
2.2 PHMSA Pipeline Mileage Data 
The mileage data of gas transmission and distribution pipelines are submitted in annual 
reports to PHMSA by pipeline operators, following the requirements in Part 191 of Title 
49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (USOFR 2013).  The total lengths of the 
onshore natural gas transmission pipelines in the US from 2002 to 2013 are shown in Fig. 
2.1.  The figure shows that there was little change in the total length between 2002 and 
2013.  The total length varied between 470,103 and 481,148 km within the 12-year 
period, with the 12-year average length of 477,149 km.  Since 2009, the total length has 
remained almost unchanged at around 480,000 km.   
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Figure 2.1 Total lengths of onshore gas transmission pipelines between 2002 and 
2013 
Figure 2.2 shows the breakdown of the total length by the pipe (outside) diameter (d, 
inches), where "Unk." denotes unknown.  The figure indicates that the change in the 
breakdown with time is small and that 40-50% of the pipelines have diameters between 
10 and 28 inches.  The percentage of pipelines with d > 28 inches appears to gradually 
increase over time.  The breakdown of the total length by the year of installation is shown 
in Fig. 2.3, which shows that older pipelines are gradually replaced by newer pipelines 
between 2002 and 2013.  However, there were still approximately 60% of the pipelines 
more than 45 years old as of 2013.   
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of total mileage by diameter from 2002 to 2013 
 
Figure 2.3 Distribution of total mileage by year of installation from 2002 to 2013 
A key consideration in the design of a natural gas transmission pipeline is the location 
class of the pipeline.  The location class is a geographic area along the pipeline classified 
primarily according to the number and proximity of buildings intended for human 
occupancy (USOFR 2013); in other words, the location class characterizes the population 
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density along the pipeline.  According to ASME B31.8 (ASME 2013) and Part 191, Title 
49 of CFR (USOFR 2013), there are four location classes for gas pipelines, namely Class 
1, Class 2, Class 3 and Class 4.  The Class 1 represents sparsely populated areas such as 
wasteland, deserts and farmland; the Class 2 reflects fringe areas around cities and towns, 
industrial areas, ranch or country estates, etc.; the Class 3 reflects areas such as suburban 
housing developments, shopping centers, residential areas, etc., and the Class 4 represents 
city centers where multistory buildings (defined as having four or more floors above 
ground) are prevalent and traffic is heavy (ASME 2013).   
According to ASME B31.8, the wall thickness, wtn, of a steel gas transmission pipeline in 
the US is in general determined as follows: 
  ··	·

  (2.1) 
where P is the design pressure; F is a safety factor that depends on the location class, and 
SMYS is the specified minimum yield strength.  Note that F decreases as the location 
class of the pipeline increases.  Given the diameter, design pressure and SMYS, the wall 
thickness of a higher location class pipeline is therefore greater than that of a lower 
location class pipeline to afford more protections for the pipeline as well as its 
surrounding population.  The breakdown of the total length by the location class is shown 
in Fig. 2.4.  The figure indicates that the vast majority of the pipelines (about 80%) are in 
Class 1 areas, whereas about 10% of the pipelines are in Class 2 and Class 3 areas, 
respectively, with very few pipelines in Class 4 areas.   
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Figure 2.4 Distribution of total mileage by location class between 2002 and 2013 
Analyses of the mileage data indicate that steel is the predominant pipe material: steel 
pipelines consistently account for over 99% of the total pipeline length between 2002 and 
2013.  The rest of the pipelines are made of materials such as cast iron, wrought iron and 
plastic.  Corrosion prevention measures are often employed on steel pipelines.  
Commonly used measures include either coating or cathodic protection or both.  The 
breakdown of the length of steel pipelines by the corrosion prevention measure is shown 
in Fig. 2.5, where CB, CC, NB and NC denote cathodically protected bare, cathodically 
protected coated, non-cathodically protected bare and non-cathodically protected coated 
steel pipelines, respectively.  Note that the breakdown of the mileage data by the 
corrosion prevention measure for years 2010 and 2011 is unavailable in the PHMSA 
database. Figure 2.5 shows that about 97-98% and 1-2% of the steel pipelines are CC and 
CB pipelines, respectively, whereas the lengths of NC and NB steel pipelines are 
negligible.   
One observation of the PHMSA pipeline mileage data is that the data structure does not 
permit breakdown of the mileage by more than one pipeline attribute.  For example, it is 
not feasible to know the length of Class 1 pipelines with diameters between 10 and 20 
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inches, or the length of Class 2 pipelines installed in the 1980s.  As a result of this 
limitation, which was also pointed out by Kiefner et al. (2001), it is not feasible to 
evaluate the incident rates considering more than one pipeline attribute.  Therefore, it is 
suggested that the PHMSA reporting format of the pipeline mileage data be revised in the 
future to allow more detailed breakdown of the mileage and facilitate more detailed 
evaluation of the incident rate.   
 
Figure 2.5 Breakdown of the length of steel pipelines by corrosion prevention 
measure between 2002 and 2013 
2.3 PHMSA Pipeline Incident Data 
2.3.1 Reporting Criteria and Brief History 
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations Parts 191, 195 (USOFR 2013) requires that 
the pipeline operator submit an incident report within 30 days of a pipeline incident or 
accident, if the incident or accident meets the reporting criteria.  According to the current 
regulation, an incident or accident on a gas pipeline is reportable if any of the following 
three criteria is met.   
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f T
o
ta
l L
en
gt
h
Year
NC
NB
CC
CB
  
12 
 
(1) An event that involves a release of gas from a pipeline, or of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), liquefied petroleum gas, refrigerant gas, or gas from an LNG facility and that 
results in one or more of the following consequences: 
(i) A death, or personal injury necessitating in-patient hospitalization; 
(ii) Estimated property damage of $50,000 or more, including loss to the operator and 
others, or both, but excluding cost of gas lost; 
(iii) Unintentional estimated gas loss of three million cubic feet or more; 
(2) An event that results in an emergency shutdown of an LNG facility.  
(3) An event that is significant in the judgment of the operator, even though it does not 
meet (1) or (2) above. 
It follows from the above that the PHMSA database does not include all pipeline 
incidents but rather includes incidents that are considered significant according to the 
criteria established in CFR.  Note that the reporting threshold of $50,000 for property 
damage has not been changed or adjusted for inflation since 1984.  Therefore, inflation 
may cause more incidents to become reportable in later years of the period from 1985 to 
present.   
The incident reports submitted by pipeline operators are based on a standard form (Form 
71002) provided by DOT.  Since 1970, the format of the standard form underwent three 
significant changes in 1984, 2002 and 2010, respectively; therefore, the PHMSA incident 
data have four different formats.  The number of data fields in the PHMSA incident 
database decreased from 149 to 81 after the 1984 change, increased from 81 to 195 after 
the 2002 change, and further increased from 195 to 552 after the 2010 change.  In general, 
the information about a given incident collected by PHMSA has become more detailed 
and elaborate over time.  In addition to significantly more data fields having been added 
to the database since 2002, the descriptions of some of the fields have been changed over 
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time, which gives rise to difficulties in combining the incident data from all periods into a 
single set of data for analyses.  
The incidents in the PHMSA database are classified as either pipe-related or non-pipe 
related.  Pipe-related incidents include those occurring on body of pipe and pipe seam, 
whereas non-pipe related incidents include those occurring on compressors, valves, 
meters, hot tap equipment, filters and so on.  Only pipe-related incidents were analyzed in 
this study.   
2.3.2 Data Aggregation  
The present study focused on analyzing the PHMSA incident data within the period of 
2002 to 2013.  As indicated in Section 2.3.1, the format of the incident data before 2010 
is different from that after 2010; therefore, care needs to be taken to aggregate the data 
from the two periods together.  The two main considerations in the data aggregation are 
the cause of the incident (i.e. failure cause) and mode of the pipeline failure due to the 
incident.  Between 2002 and 2009, there were seven main failure causes, namely 
corrosion, natural forces, excavation, other outside forces, material and welds, equipment 
and operations, and other.  Each main failure cause consists of certain number of 
secondary causes; for example, corrosion consists of internal and external corrosions.  
After 2010, eight main failure causes were included: corrosion, natural forces, excavation, 
other outside forces, material failure of pipe or weld, equipment failure, incorrect 
operation and other.  Each main failure is further divided into several secondary failure 
causes.  The main and secondary failure causes for the periods of 2002-2009 and after 
2010 are summarized in Table 2.1.  
For the purpose of the data aggregation, the sets of failure causes identified in the periods 
of 2002-2009 and 2010-2013 were mapped to a single set of failure causes adopted in this 
study.  The mapping is shown in Table 2.1.  Note that the set of failure causes adopted in 
this study are to a large extent consistent with those identified after 2010.  Note also that 
although the failure cause "Other" employed in this study is corresponding to a 
significant number of secondary failure causes in both 2002-2009 and 2010-2013, the 
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contribution of each individual cause to the overall number of incidents is relatively small.  
For example, the failure causes “incorrect operation”, “equipment failure” and “heavy 
rains/floods” only account for 1.1%, 1.5% and 0.9%, respectively, of the overall number 
of pipe-related incidents; therefore, it is considered reasonable to combine them into one 
main failure cause category. 
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Table 2.1 Mapping of failure causes for the two report formats 
2002-2009 2010-2013 
Failure causes 
adopted in this 
study (acronym) 
Co
rr
o
sio
n
 
Internal corrosion 
Co
rr
o
sio
n
 
Internal corrosion Internal 
corrosion (IC) 
External corrosion External corrosion External 
corrosion (EC) 
M
at
er
ia
l a
n
d 
w
el
ds
 
Body of pipe 
M
at
er
ia
l f
ai
lu
re
 
o
f p
ip
e 
o
r 
w
el
d  
Material failure 
(MF) 
Component  
Joint  
Butt  
Fillet  
Pipe seam  
 
Construction-, installation-, or 
fabrication-related 
 
Original manufacturing-related(not girth 
weld or other welds formed in the field) 
 Environmental cracking-related 
Ex
ca
v
at
io
n
 
Third party excavation 
damage 
Ex
ca
v
at
io
n
 
Excavation damage by third party Third-party 
excavation (TPE) 
Operator excavation 
damage (includes 
contractors) 
Excavation damage by operator (first 
party) 
First- and 
second-party 
excavation 
(FSPE) 
Excavation damage by operator's 
contractor (second party) 
O
th
er
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
fo
rc
es
 
Rupture of previously 
damaged pipe 
Previous damage due to excavation 
activity Previously damaged pipe 
(PDP) 
O
th
er
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
fo
rc
es
 
Previous mechanical damage not related 
to excavation 
Car, truck or other 
vehicle not related to 
excavation activity 
Damage by car, truck, or other motorized 
vehicle/equipment not engaged in 
excavation 
Vehicle not 
engaged in 
excavation (V) 
Fire/explosion as 
primary cause of 
failure 
Nearby industrial, man-made, or other 
fire/explosion as primary cause of 
incident 
Other (O) 
Vandalism Intentional damage 
 
Damage by boats, barges, drilling rigs, or 
other maritime equipment or vessels set 
adrift or which have otherwise lost their 
mooring 
 
Routine or normal fishing or other 
maritime activity not engaged in 
excavation 
 
Electrical arcing from other equipment or 
facility 
 Other outside force damage 
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Eq
ui
pm
en
t a
n
d 
o
pe
ra
tio
n
s 
Malfunction of 
control/relief 
equipment 
Eq
ui
pm
en
t f
ai
lu
re
 
Malfunction of control/relief equipment 
Threads stripped, 
broken pipe coupling Threaded connection/coupling failure 
Ruptured or leaking 
seal/pump packing  
 
Compressor or compressor-related 
equipment 
 Non-threaded connection failure 
 Defective or loose tubing or fitting 
 
Failure of equipment body(except 
compressor), vessel plate, or other 
material 
 Other equipment failure 
Incorrect operation 
In
co
rr
ec
t o
pe
ra
tio
n
 
Damage by operator or operator's 
contractor not related to excavation and 
not due to motorized vehicle/equipment 
damage 
Underground gas storage, pressure 
vessel, or cavern allowed or caused to 
overpressure 
Valve left or placed in wrong position, 
but not resulting in an overpressure 
Pipeline or equipment overpressured 
Equipment not installed properly 
Wrong equipment specified or installed 
Other incorrect operation 
O
th
er
 Miscellaneous 
O
th
er
 Miscellaneous 
Unknown Unknown 
N
at
u
ra
l f
o
rc
es
 
Heavy rains/floods 
N
at
u
ra
l f
o
rc
es
 
Heavy rains/floods 
Temperature Temperature 
High winds High winds 
Lightning Lightning 
 Other natural force damage 
Earth movement Earth movement Earth movement (EM) 
Another consideration in the data aggregation is the failure mode of the pipeline in a 
given incident.  Three failure modes were identified for the incident data between 2002 
and 2009 (see Table 2.2): leak, rupture and other.  A leak is further categorized as a 
pinhole, connection failure or puncture, whereas a rupture is further classified as a 
circumferential or longitudinal rupture.  The incident data for the period of 2010-2013 
included four failure modes (see Table 2.2): mechanical puncture, leak, rupture and other.  
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A leak is further classified as a pinhole, crack, connection failure, seal or packing or other 
type of leak, whereas a rupture is classified as a circumferential, longitudinal or other 
type of rupture.  Similar to the mapping of the failure causes, the two sets of failure 
modes identified in the two reporting periods were mapped to a single set of failure 
modes in this study, as shown in Table 2.2.   
Table 2.2 Mapping of failure modes for the two report formats 
2002-2009 2010-2013 Failure modes adopted in this 
study 
Leak 
Pinhole 
Leak 
Pinhole 
Leak 
 Crack 
Connection 
failure Connection failure 
 Seal or packing 
 Other leak type 
Puncture Mechanical puncture Puncture 
Rupture 
Circumferential 
Rupture 
Circumferential 
Rupture Longitudinal Longitudinal 
 
Other of rupture 
type 
Other Other Other 
2.3.3 Incident Data Analysis 
2.3.3.1 Distribution of incidents by failure cause 
Between 2002 and 2013, a total of 464 pipe-related incidents on onshore gas transmission 
pipelines were reported to PHMSA.  The distribution of these incidents with respect to 
the set of failure causes adopted in this study is shown in Fig. 2.6.  The figure shows that 
the third-party excavation (TPE), external corrosion (EC), material failure (MF) and 
internal corrosion (IC), in the order of descending contributions, are the four most 
common failure causes and responsible for over 75% of the 464 incidents.  In particular, 
TPE and EC are responsible for half of all incidents, with the contribution of TPE slightly 
higher than that of EC.  Note that EC and IC are responsible for about 32% of all 
incidents, markedly larger than the proportion of incidents due to corrosion (17.9%) 
among all incidents on US gas transmission pipelines obtained by Golub et al. in 1996 
and that among all incidents on US gas transmission and gathering pipelines (22.1%) 
obtained by Kiefner et al. in 2001.  The breakdowns of all incidents and of those 
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incidents due to TPE, EC, MF and IC by various pipeline attributes, the failure mode and 
failure consequences are presented in the following sections.   
 
Figure 2.6 Distribution of all pipe-related incidents between 2002 and 2013 by 
failure cause 
2.3.3.2 Distributions of incidents by pipeline attributes  
The breakdowns of the number of incidents by four pipeline attributes, namely the 
diameter, year of installation, location class and corrosion prevention measures are 
presented in this section.  The distribution of the total number of incidents by the 
diameter is shown in Fig. 2.7.  The figure shows that about 76% of the incidents occurred 
on pipelines with 4 < d ≤ 28 inches.  The proportions of incidents on pipelines with d < 4 
inches and 4 < d ≤ 10 inches are remarkably consistent with the proportions of the 
corresponding lengths in the overall pipeline mileage (see Fig. 2.2).  On the other hand, 
the proportions of incidents on pipelines with 10 < d ≤ 20 inches, and d > 20 inches are 
somewhat higher and lower, respectively, than the proportions of the corresponding 
lengths.   
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The breakdowns of the TPE-, EC-, MF- and IC-caused incidents by diameter are shown 
in Fig. 2.8.  It is interesting to note that the majority of the incidents due to TPE (79.5%) 
or IC (84.6%) occurred on pipelines with small or medium diameters (i.e. 4 < d ≤ 20 
inches).  On the other hand, the majority of the incidents due to EC (79.1%) or MF 
(87.2%) occurred on pipelines with medium or large diameters (i.e. d > 10 inches).  The 
concentration of TPE-caused incidents on pipelines with small or medium diameters can 
be explained by the fact that such pipelines tend to have relatively small wall thicknesses 
and therefore are more likely to fail once impacted in the excavation.  It is however 
unclear as to the reason that EC-caused incidents occurred more frequently on pipelines 
with relatively large diameters than IC-caused incidents.   
 
Figure 2.7 Distribution of all incidents by diameter 
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Figure 2.8 Distribution of incidents due to TPE, EC, MF and IC by diameter 
The distribution of the incidents by the year of installation of the pipeline is depicted in 
Fig. 2.9.  The figure shows that 53% of the incidents occurred on pipelines installed in 
the 1950s and 1960s.  This is generally consistent with the proportion of the length of 
such pipelines in the overall mileage as shown in Fig. 2.3.  The figure also suggests, not 
surprisingly, that in general incidents are more likely to occur on older pipelines than on 
newer pipelines.  The breakdown of the numbers of incidents due to TPE, EC, MF and IC 
by the year of installation is shown in Fig. 2.10.  Fifty percent of the MF-caused incidents 
occurred on pipelines installed in the 1950s.  Given that the pipelines installed in the 
1950s account for only about 20% of the total mileage (see Fig. 2.3), it can be inferred 
that the pipes or field-welding or both in that period are of relatively poor quality.  The 
breakdowns of EC- and IC-caused incidents by the year of installation are in general 
similar.  However, it is noteworthy that a significant portion (about 20%) of IC-caused 
incidents occurred on pipelines installed in the 1980s.   
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Figure 2.9 Distribution of all incidents by year of installation 
 
Figure 2.10 Distribution of incidents due to TPE, EC, MF and IC by year of 
installation 
The distribution of the incidents by the location class is depicted in Fig. 2.11.  The 
distribution is consistent with the proportions of the lengths of pipelines in the four 
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location classes as shown in Fig. 2.4.  The distributions of the incidents due to TPE, EC, 
MF and IC by the location class are shown in Fig. 2.12.  Two observations can be made 
from the figure.  First, the vast majority (95%) of the IC-caused incidents occurred on 
Class 1 pipelines, which is markedly more than the proportion (about 80%) of the length 
of Class 1 pipelines.  Second, a significant portion (20%) of the TPE-caused incidents 
occurred on Class 3 pipelines.  This can be explained by the fact that the relatively high 
population density associated with Class 3 generally results in more excavation activities 
and a higher likelihood of the pipelines being impacted.   
 
Figure 2.11 Distribution of all incidents by location class 
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Figure 2.12 Distribution of incidents due to TPE, EC, MF and IC by location class 
It was observed that 99.4% of the incidents occurred on steel pipelines, which is 
consistent with the proportion of the length of steel pipelines as described in Section 2.2.  
The distributions of EC- and IC-caused incidents on steel pipelines by the corrosion 
prevention measure are shown in Fig. 2.13.  The figure shows that 81% of EC-caused 
incidents and 88% of IC-caused incidents occurred on CC steel pipelines, both 
percentages markedly lower than the proportion (about 97-98%) of the length of CC 
pipelines.  On the other hand, 19% of EC-caused incidents and 12% of IC-caused 
incidents occurred on CB/UB/UC pipelines, both percentages markedly higher than the 
proportion (less than 3%) of the length of such pipelines.  This demonstrates the 
effectiveness of cathodical protection and coating in preventing corrosion on steel 
pipelines.   
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Figure 2.13 Distribution of incidents due to EC and IC by corrosion prevention 
measure 
2.3.3.3 Distributions of incidents by failure mode and ignition 
The distribution of the incidents by the set of failure modes adopted in this study (see 
Table 2.2) is shown in Fig. 2.14.  The figure indicates that rupture is the most common 
failure mode with 38% of the incidents resulting in ruptures, followed by leak (30%) and 
puncture (20%).  Given that different failure modes can have drastically different failure 
consequences (e.g. the impact zone associated with an ignited rupture can be much larger 
than that of an ignited leak), the breakdowns of the incidents by all failure modes and 
failure causes were analyzed and are shown in Fig. 2.15.  The figure indicates that a little 
over 50% of EC- and IC-caused incidents resulted in ruptures.  The majority of the TPE-
caused incidents resulted in punctures (about 60%), followed by ruptures (22%).  Very 
few leaks resulted from TPE-caused incidents.  The percentages of leaks and ruptures 
resulting from MF-caused incidents are approximately 55 and 35%, respectively.  Finally, 
the majority (between 70-80%) of the incidents due to previously damaged pipe (PDP) 
and earth movement (EM) resulted in ruptures.   
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Figure 2.14 Distribution of incidents by failure mode 
  
Figure 2.15 Distribution of incidents by failure mode for each failure cause 
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majority (85%) of the incidents did not involve ignition.  For those ignited incidents, 
about half of them also lead to explosions.  Note that ignition means only a jet fire is 
created in the incident whereas explosion means that a fireball precedes the jet fire.  The 
distributions of the incidents by ignition and the failure cause are show in Fig. 2.17.  It is 
worth pointing out that all ignited incidents caused by earth movement lead to explosions, 
whereas no incidents caused by vehicles not engaged in excavation (i.e. V) lead to 
ignition.  The distributions of the incidents by ignition and the failure mode are shown in 
Fig. 2.18.  This figure clearly shows that the likelihood of ignition is very small (about 
3%) in leak incidents and about 10% in puncture incidents.  However, the likelihood of 
ignition in rupture incidents is significant (about 30%).   
  
Figure 2.16 Distribution of incidents by ignition 
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Figure 2.17 Distribution of incidents by ignition and failure cause 
 
Figure 2.18 Distribution of incidents by ignition and failure mode 
2.3.3.4 Distribution of injuries and fatalities 
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pipeline.  The 464 pipe-related incidents having occurred between 2002 and 2013 caused 
a total of 16 fatalities and 75 injuries.  The breakdowns of the fatalities and injuries by the 
failure cause are shown in Fig. 2.19.  This figure indicates that three failure causes, i.e. 
MF, TPE and EC, are responsible for all the fatalities and that five failure causes, i.e. MF, 
TPE, EC, FSPE and PDP, are responsible for all the injuries.  It should be noted that the 
fatalities (8) and injuries (51) associated with MF all come from one single incident: the 
explosion of a gas pipeline in San Bruno, California in 2010.   
  
Figure 2.19 Breakdown of fatalities and injuries by failure cause 
Given that the potential casualties caused by an incident is correlated with the population 
density in the vicinity of the pipeline, the breakdowns of the fatalities and injuries by the 
location class are shown in Fig. 2.20.  Note that the fatalities and injuries in Class 3 all 
come from the San Bruno incident in 2010.  All the other fatalities and injuries are due to 
incidents on Class 1 pipelines except for one injury due to an incident on a Class 2 
pipeline.  The breakdowns of the fatalities and injuries by the failure mode are shown in 
Fig. 2.21.  The figure shows that 75 and 83% of the fatalities and injuries, respectively, 
were caused by rupture incidents.  The PHMSA database further categories the fatalities 
and injuries resulting from a given incident into three groups: employees, non-employee 
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contractors and general public.  Employees are defined as operator employees and 
contractor employees working for the operator, while non-employee contractors are 
employees of the third-party contractors. The breakdowns of the fatalities and injuries by 
their affiliations are shown in Fig. 2.22.  The figure indicates that the majority of the 
fatalities and injuries were the general public.   
  
Figure 2.20 Breakdown of fatalities and injuries by location class 
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Figure 2.21 Breakdown of fatalities and injuries by failure mode  
 
Figure 2.22 Distribution of fatalities and injuries by affiliation 
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2.4 Analyses of Rupture Rate 
2.4.1 General 
Given the incident and mileage data, the incident rate, i.e. the number of incidents per km 
per year can be evaluated.  The significance of the incident rate is two-fold.  First, it can 
be used as a basis for comparing the likelihoods of failure for pipelines with different 
attributes, if the rate is evaluated from the corresponding length of the pipeline.  Second, 
the incident rate can be used as the annual probability of failure in the quantitative risk 
assessment of the pipeline in lieu of the probability of failure evaluated from more 
detailed analyses (e.g. the structural reliability analysis).   
In this study, only the rate of the rupture incident was analyzed.  This is based on two 
considerations.  First, given the reporting criteria associated with PHMSA incident data 
and severity of a typical rupture incident, it can be inferred that most, if not all, of the 
ruptures were reported to PHMSA. On the other hand, the number of leaks or punctures 
that did not meet the reporting criteria may be significant compared with the number of 
reported leaks and punctures.  Therefore, the rupture rate evaluated using the PHMSA 
database is believed to be representative of the actual rupture rate.  Second, the 
consequences associated with ruptures are far more severe than those associated with 
leaks and punctures.  This is evident from the results presented in Section 2.3.3.3 and 
2.3.3.4, which show that most leaks (about 97%) and punctures (about 90%) did not 
result in ignition and that the majority of fatalities and injuries (75% and 83%, 
respectively) were due to ruptures.  Therefore, the rupture rate is much more relevant to 
the pipeline risk assessment than the leak and puncture rates.  The analysis of the rupture 
rate is presented in the following sections.   
2.4.2 Rupture rates by failure cause and year of occurrence 
The average rate of rupture between 2002 and 2013, R, due to all failure causes combined 
was calculated to be 3.1 × 10-5 /km-year using the following equation: 
   ∑    (2.2) 
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where Ni is the number of ruptures due to all failure causes occurring in the ith year (i = 1 
for year 2002), and Li (km) is the overall length of the pipelines in the ith year (see Fig. 
2.1).  Equation (2.2) was also used to evaluate the 12-year average rate of rupture due to 
the individual failure cause by replacing Ni with the number of ruptures due to the 
particular failure cause.  The calculated rupture rates are shown in Fig. 2.23.  As shown in 
the figure, the rupture rates due to TPE, MF, EC and IC equal 4.6 × 10-6, 4.7 × 10-6, 1.0 × 
10-5 and 3.5 × 10-6 per km-year, respectively.  The rupture rate due to the four causes 
combined equals 2.3 × 10-5 per km-year, which is about 74% of the rupture rate (3.1 ×  
10-5 per km-year) due to all failure causes combined.  Figure 2.23 indicates that EC is the 
leading cause for ruptures of onshore gas transmission pipelines in the US between 2002 
and 2013.  The rupture rates due to TPE and MF, respectively, are about half of the 
rupture rate due to EC.  Note that the rupture rate due to EC and IC combined, which 
equals 1.35 × 10-5 per km-year, is substantially smaller than the incident rate due to 
corrosion (e.g. 8.70 × 10-5 per km-year for coated pipes) obtained by Golub et al. (1996).  
The rupture rate due to EC is close to the incident rate due to external corrosion for CC 
pipelines (i.e. 9.69 × 10-6 per km-year) obtained by Kiefner et al.   
  
Figure 2.23 Distribution of rupture rates by failure cause 
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The rupture rates corresponding to all failure causes combined as well as corresponding 
to TPE, EC, MF and IC individually were evaluated for each year between 2002 and 
2013.  The results are shown in Fig. 2.24.  Furthermore, the three-year moving average 
rupture rates were evaluated.  Note that the moving average at a given year Y was 
calculated as the average of the rupture rates for years Y, Y - 1 and Y - 2.  Therefore, the 
moving average starts at year 2004 in Fig. 2.25.  The figure shows that the three-year 
moving average rupture rate due to all failure causes combined did not change much with 
time, although there appears to be a decreasing trend in the moving average rate since 
2009.  There is a clear decreasing trend in the moving average rate due to TPE between 
2007 and 2011, and the rate has remained practically unchanged since 2011.  The moving 
average rupture rates due to EC and MF appear to generally decrease and increase, 
respectively, since 2009.  It is interesting to note that the variation pattern of the three-
year moving average rupture rate corresponding to EC is consistent with that 
corresponding to IC.   
 
Figure 2.24 Rupture rates by year of occurrence 
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Figure 2.25 Three-year moving average rupture rates from 2004 to 2013 
2.4.3 Rupture rates by pipeline attributes  
The average rupture rate between 2002 and 2013 due to all failure causes combined for 
pipelines with a given attribute (e.g. diameter, location class or year of installation) was 
evaluated using the following generic equation: 
•   ∑ ••   (2.3) 
where R• is the rupture rate for pipelines with a given attribute denoted by a generic 
symbol •; Ni• is the number of ruptures occurring on pipelines with attribute • in the ith 
year; Li• (km) is the corresponding length of pipelines with attribute • in the ith year, and 
n is the total number of years for which the rupture and mileage data corresponding to a 
specific attribute are available.  Note that n equals 12 in most cases; however, n equals 4 
for evaluating the rupture rate for pipelines installed in the 2010s.  
The rupture rates of pipelines with different diameters are shown in Fig. 2.26.  The figure 
shows that the rupture rates corresponding to four diameter ranges, i.e. d ≤ 4, 4 < d ≤ 10, 
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20 < d ≤ 28 and d > 28 inches, are similar and markedly lower than the rupture rate 
corresponding to 10 < d ≤ 20 inches.   
 
Figure 2.26 Rupture rates by diameter 
The rupture rates due to TPE, EC, MF and IC for different diameter ranges were further 
evaluated and are compared in Fig. 2.27.  The figure indicates that the TPE-caused 
rupture rates for small-to-medium diameter pipelines (4 < d ≤ 20 inches) is much higher 
than those for pipelines with d ≤ 4 and d > 20 inches.  The EC-caused rupture rates for 10 
< d ≤ 20 and 20 < d ≤ 28 inches are markedly higher than those for the rest of the 
diameter ranges.  The MF-caused rupture rate is the highest for pipelines with 10 < d ≤ 20 
inches.  For median- and large-diameter pipelines (d > 10 inches), the EC-caused rupture 
rates are markedly higher than those due to TPE, MF and IC, which suggests that EC is 
the most common cause for ruptures of such pipelines.   
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Figure 2.27 Rupture rates due to TPE, EC, MF and IC by diameter 
The average rupture rates due to all failure causes combined for pipelines with different 
years of installation are shown in Fig. 2.28.  The figure clearly shows that the rupture 
rates for newer pipelines are lower than those for older pipelines, except for one anomaly 
whereby the rupture rate for pipelines installed in the 2010s is markedly higher than those 
for pipelines installed in 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.  This is due to the fact that the total 
length of the pipelines installed in the 2010s is small compared with the lengths of the 
pipelines installed in other periods.  For example, the total lengths of the pipelines 
installed in the 2010s are 3,201, 8,084, 11,092 and 13,910 km in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 
2013, respectively, whereas the total lengths of the pipelines installed in the 2000s are 
46,380, 46,821, 47,581 and 47,547 km in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively.  In 
fact, only one rupture occurred on pipelines installed in the 2010s between 2010 and 
2013.   
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Figure 2.28 Distribution of rupture rates by year of installation 
The rupture rates due to TPE, EC, MF and IC for pipelines with different years of 
installation are compared in Fig. 2.29.  The figure shows that the EC-caused rupture rate 
increases in general as the pipeline age increases; however, there is no strong correlation 
between the IC-caused rupture rate and pipeline age.  Note that the TPE-caused rupture 
rate generally increases as the pipeline age increases.  One hypothesis to explain this 
phenomenon is that the actual locations of older pipelines may not be as clearly indicated 
as those of newer pipelines, which makes older pipelines more susceptible to third-party 
excavation activities.  This may also explain that the TPE-caused rupture rate for 
pipelines with unknown years of installation is the highest, as such pipelines are mostly 
likely to have incomplete records for their locations, making them most susceptible to 
third-party excavations.  MF-caused rupture rates for older pipelines are basically higher 
than those for newer pipelines except pipelines installed in 2010s, which is due to the 
relative short length of such pipelines as explained in the previous paragraph.  Finally, 
Fig. 2.29 indicates that EC is the leading cause for rupture for all pipelines installed in the 
1960s or earlier.   
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Figure 2.29 Rupture rates due to TPE, EC, MF and IC by year of installation 
The rupture rates due to all failure causes combined for pipelines in different classes are 
shown in Fig. 2.30.  The figure shows that the rupture rates for Classes 1, 2 and 3 
pipelines are somewhat similar. 
 
Figure 2.30 Distribution of rupture rates by location class 
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The rupture rates due to TPE, EC, MF and IC for pipelines with different location classes 
are compared in Fig. 2.31.  As the relatively high population density in Class 3 areas 
implies more third-party excavation activities, it is not entirely unexpected that the TPE-
caused rupture rate for Class 3 pipelines is markedly higher than those for Class 2 and 
Class 1 pipelines.  This however suggests that the safety factor incorporated in the design 
of the wall thickness for Class 3 pipelines may not be adequate from the perspective of 
preventing the third-party excavation damage.   
 
Figure 2.31 Rupture rates due to TPE, EC, MF and IC by location class 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this study, we carried out statistical analyses of the mileage and pipe-related incidents 
corresponding to onshore gas transmission pipelines in the United States between 2002 
and 2013 obtained from the PHMSA database.  The incident data for the periods of 2002-
2009 and 2010-2013 were aggregated by either the failure cause or failure mode.  The set 
of failure causes adopted in this study included the internal and external corrosions (IC 
and EC), third-party excavation (TPE), material failure (MF), first- and second-party 
excavation (FSPE), previously damage pipe (PDP), vehicle not engaged in excavation 
(V) and other (O).  The set of failure modes adopted in this study included leak, puncture, 
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rupture and other.  The mileage and incident data were used to evaluate the rate of 
rupture incidents per km per year for onshore gas transmission pipelines.  The following 
are the main findings of the analysis.   
1. The total length of the onshore gas transmission pipelines in the US varied 
between about 470,000 and 480,000 km from 2002 to 2013, and remained at 
around 480,000 km since 2009.  About 97% of the pipelines are steel pipelines 
with both the coating and cathodic protection.  As of 2013, about 60% of the 
pipelines were more than 45 years old.   
2. Class 1 pipelines account for approximately 80% of the total length; Class 2 and 
Class 3 pipelines, respectively, account for about 10% of the total length, and the 
length of Class 4 pipelines is negligibly small.   
3. TPE, EC, MF and IC are the four most common causes for the pipe-related 
incidents, responsible for over 75% of a total of 464 incidents between 2002 and 
2013.  About 50% of the incidents were caused by TPE and EC.  The proportion 
of corrosion-caused incidents in this study is about 32% and markedly larger than 
the proportions of corrosion-caused incidents obtained by Golub et al. in 1996 and 
Kiefner et al. in 2001.  Approximately 80% of the TPE- and 85% of the IC-caused 
incidents occurred on pipelines with small or medium diameters (4 < d ≤ 20 
inches) whereas about 79% of the EC- and 87% of the MF-caused incidents 
occurred on pipelines with medium or large diameters (d > 10 inches).  
4. Rupture is the most common failure mode, with 38% of the incidents resulting in 
ruptures.  About 30% and 20% of the incidents resulted in leaks and punctures, 
respectively.  Just over half of EC- and IC-caused incidents resulted in ruptures; 
60% and 22% of TPE-caused incidents resulted in punctures and ruptures, 
respectively, and 55% and 35% of MF-caused incidents resulted in leaks and 
ruptures, respectively.   
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5. The likelihood of ignition given a leak, puncture or rupture approximately equals 
3, 10 or 30%, respectively.  Rupture incidents are responsible for 75 and 83%, 
respectively, of a total of 16 fatalities and 75 injuries resulting from the 464 pipe-
related incidents between 2002 and 2013.   
6. The 12-year average rupture rate equals 3.1 × 10-5 /km-year due to all failure 
causes combined, and 2.3 × 10-5 /km-year due to TPE, EC, MF and IC combined.  
The rupture rate due to EC and IC combined equals 1.35 × 10-5 /km-year and is 
notably smaller than the incident rate due to corrosion (e.g. 8.70 × 10-5 per km-
year for coated pipes) obtained by Golub et al. (1996).  EC is the leading cause for 
rupture: the EC-caused rupture rate equals 1.0 × 10-5 /km-year and is about twice 
the rupture rate due to TPE or MF.  The rupture rate due to EC is close to the 
incident rate due to corrosion for CC pipelines (i.e. 9.69 × 10-6 per km-year) 
obtained by Kiefner et al. in 2001.  Furthermore, EC is the leading cause for 
rupture for all pipelines installed in the 1960s or earlier.   
7. The three-year moving average rupture rate due to TPE gradually decreased 
between 2007 and 2011 and remained almost unchanged since 2011.  There 
appears to be decreasing and increasing trends, respectively, in the three-year 
moving average rupture rates due to EC and MF since 2009.   
8. The TPE-caused rupture rate for Class 3 pipelines is markedly higher than those 
for Class 1 and Class 2 pipelines.  This suggests that the safety factor prescribed 
for the design of Class 3 pipelines may not be adequate in terms of protecting the 
pipelines from the third-party excavation damage.   
9. It is suggested that the PHMSA pipeline mileage data include a more refined data 
structure to allow the breakdown of the mileage by more than one pipeline 
attributes and evaluation of the rupture rates for pipelines with different attributes.  
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Chapter 3  
Development of Probability of Ignition Model for Ruptures 
of Onshore Gas Transmission Pipelines  
3.1 Introduction 
In the US and Canada, onshore transmission pipelines are the most common means to 
transport large quantity of natural gas from processing plants in gas producing regions to 
distribution centres in high-consumption regions.  Failures, defined as the loss of pressure 
containment, of these pipelines do occur, albeit infrequently, due to various causes such 
as the third-party excavation activities, internal/external corrosion and ground movement.  
Three failure modes are generally associated with onshore pipelines, namely the small or 
pinhole leak, large leak (or puncture) and full-bore rupture (Nessim et al. 2009).  A given 
failure may or may not lead to ignition of the released gas.  In terms of human safety and 
property damage, the consequences associated with non-ignited failures and ignited 
small/large leaks are in general low (Acton and Baldwin 2008; Nessim et al. 2009).  
However, the consequences of ignited ruptures of gas pipelines can be extremely severe, 
as evident from such well-known past failures as the Carlsbad, New Mexico incident in 
2000 (NTSB 2003) and San Bruno, California incident in 2010 (NTSB 2011).  Therefore, 
an important task in the quantitative risk assessment of onshore gas transmission 
pipelines is to estimate the probability of ignition (POI) given rupture.   
Acton et al. (2002) reviewed the pipeline incident data obtained from onshore gas 
transmission pipeline operators in Europe and Canada, and investigated the relationship 
between POI and the product of the internal pressure at the time of the incident (p) and 
square of the outside diameter (d2) of the pipeline, whereby pd2 is directly related to the 
initial gas outflow from a rupture.  The authors grouped pipelines into different ranges of 
pd2 values and calculated POI within a given range of pd2 values as the proportion of the 
number of ignited incidents to the total number of incidents within the range.  The POI 
values were observed to increase approximately linearly with the average pd2 values 
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corresponding to different pd2 ranges. The authors therefore proposed a simple POI 
model for rupture as follows:  
POI      POI !   (3.1) 
where A and B are the model parameters and can be evaluated from the least squares-
based simple linear regression analysis, and POImax is an upper bound probability of 
ignition.  Acton et al. suggested POImax to be set at 0.8, but did not report the values of A 
and B.   
Acton and Baldwin (2008) reported the values of A, B and POImax in Eq. (3.1) based on 
the onshore gas transmission pipeline incident data obtained from the PIPESAFE Group 
(consisting of several gas transmission pipeline companies in Europe and Canada) and 
the pipeline incident database administered by the Pipeline and Hazardous Material 
Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the United States Department of Transportation.  
Based on the rupture incident data between 1970 and 1996 obtained from the PIPESAFE 
Group, A, B and POImax were evaluated to be 0.0725, 0.0151 and 0.8, respectively.  Based 
on the PIPESAFE rupture data between 1970 and 2004, the values of A, B and POImax 
were reported to be 0.0584, 0.0160 and 0.83, respectively.  Finally, based on the 
combined PIPESAFE rupture data between 1970 and 2004 and PHMSA rupture data 
between 2002 and 2007, the values of A, B and POImax were reported to be 0.0555, 
0.0137 and 0.81, respectively.  Note that the units of p and d in Eq. (3.1) are bar (1 bar = 
0.1 MPa) and meter, respectively, corresponding to the aforementioned B values.   
There are several drawbacks associated with the POI model given by Eq. (3.1).  First, the 
model parameters are evaluated by grouping the incident data into ranges of pd2 values.  
The sensitivity of the model parameters to the grouping criterion has not been 
investigated.  Second, the model is not naturally bounded by zero and unity as required 
by the nature of probability.  The lack of the upper bound of unity is in particular 
problematic; therefore, a somewhat arbitrary upper bound (POImax) is included in the 
model.  Finally, the least squares-based simple linear regression analysis used to fit the 
POI model is predicated on the condition that the difference between the observed and 
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predicted outcomes (i.e. error) is normally distributed with a constant variance (Hosmer 
et al. 2013).  However, such a condition is violated for the POI model because the 
observed outcome of the data used in the fitting is of the binary nature (Hosmer et al. 
2013), i.e. either ignition or non-ignition for a given incident.   
The objective of the study reported in this chapter was to develop a new POI model that 
overcomes the drawbacks of the POI model given by Eq. (3.1).  To this end, both the 
logistic and log-logistic POI models were proposed.  The maximum likelihood method 
was employed to evaluate the model parameters based on the onshore gas transmission 
pipeline rupture incident data between 2002 and 2014 included in the PHMSA database.  
The PIPESAFE rupture incident data reported by Acton and Baldwin (2008) were used to 
validate the proposed POI model.  The new POI model will facilitate the risk assessment 
of onshore natural gas transmission pipelines.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 presents a brief overview of 
the PHMSA incident database and exploratory analyses of the PHMSA incident data 
selected for this study.  The evaluation of the parameters of the proposed POI model 
using the maximum likelihood method is described in Section 3.3.  The confidence 
interval associated with the proposed model is also presented in Section 3.3.  The 
validation of the model is presented in Section 3.4, followed by summary and 
conclusions in Section 3.5.  
3.2 PHMSA Pipeline Incident Data and Exploratory Data 
Analysis 
Since 1970, operators of oil and gas pipelines regulated by PHMSA have been required 
to submit incident reports to PHMSA within 30 days of the occurrence of incidents that 
meet the reporting criteria specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191 
and 195 (USOFR 2013).  PHMSA's incident report includes information such as the 
cause (e.g. third-party excavation, external corrosion, earth movement, etc.) of the 
incident as well as the basic attributes (e.g. diameter, maximum allowable operating 
pressure, internal pressure at the time of the incident, etc.) and failure mode (i.e. leak, 
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puncture or rupture) of the pipeline involved in the incident.  The reported incidents were 
stored in the PHMSA pipeline incident database, which can be accessed from 
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/data-stats.  Starting in 2002, whether an 
incident involved ignition was included in the incident report, which makes it feasible to 
develop a POI model based on the PHMSA incident data dated in or after 2002.  
The PHMSA incident data between 2002 and 2014 were examined to select the 
appropriate data for the present study based on two criteria: 1) the incidents occurred on 
onshore natural gas transmission pipelines, and 2) the pipelines failed by full-bore 
rupture.  A total of 188 rupture incidents were identified as a result, 59 of them being 
ignited incidents.  The diameters of the pipelines involved in the incidents range from 
13.7 to 914.4 mm; the maximum allowable operating pressures range from 1.0 to 20.7 
MPa, and the internal pressures at times of incidents range from 0.3 to 14.6 MPa.  
Detailed information about the data is included in Appendix A.   
In light of Eq. (3.1), the potential correlation between POI and pd2 (MPa-mm2) for the 
selected data set was examined first.  To this end, ten pd2 values were selected to divide 
the 188 data points into ten groups, with each group consisting of approximately 19 data 
points.  For each group, POI was then computed as the ratio of the number of ignited 
incidents to the number of all incidents in the group, and the average pd2 value for all the 
incidents in the group was also evaluated.  Table 3.1 summarizes the grouped data.   
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Table 3.1 Estimated POI with pd2 for PHMSA rupture incident data 
Group 
No. 
pd2 Range 
(×105 MPa-mm2) 
No. of 
Incidents 
No. of Ignited 
Incidents 
Mean pd2 for 
Incidents 
(×105 MPa-mm2) 
POI 
1 ≤ 0.8 19 1 0.5 5.3% 
2 (0.8, 2.3] 19 0 1.6 0.0% 
3 (2.3,3.2] 19 3 2.8 15.8% 
4 (3.2, 4.9] 19 2 4.3 10.5% 
5 (4.9, 8.1] 19 6 6.2 31.6% 
6 (8.1, 10.6] 18 5 9.6 27.8% 
7 (10.6, 15.5] 19 8 12.9 42.1% 
8 (15.5, 20.1] 19 8 17.8 42.1% 
9 (20.1, 35.8] 19 11 25.8 57.9% 
10 > 35.8 18 13 43.8 72.2% 
The POI values for the ten groups are plotted against the corresponding average pd2 
values in Fig. 3.1.  The figure suggests that there is a strong correlation between POI and 
pd2: the correlation coefficient between the sets of POI and pd2 values equals 0.94.  This 
observation agrees with that made by Acton et al. (2002) and confirms the suitability of 
pd2 as a predicator in the POI model.   
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Figure 3.1 POI vs. pd2 for the PHMSA rupture data 
The potential correlation between POI and the location class of the ruptured pipeline was 
also investigated.  In the US, a natural gas pipeline is assigned a location class that 
characterizes the population density in the vicinity of the pipeline.  According to ASME 
B31.8 (ASME 2013) and Part 191, Title 49 of CFR (USOFR 2013), there are four 
location classes for gas pipelines, namely Class 1, Class 2, Class 3 and Class 4.  The 
Class 1 represents sparsely populated areas such as wasteland, deserts and farmland; the 
Class 2 reflects fringe areas around cities and towns, industrial areas, ranch or country 
estates, etc.; the Class 3 reflects areas such as suburban housing developments, shopping 
centres, residential areas, etc., and the Class 4 represents city centres where multistory 
buildings (defined as having four or more floors above ground) are prevalent and traffic 
is heavy.  A higher population density implies the presence of more potential ignition 
sources; therefore, it is hypothesized that POI for ruptures of pipelines of higher location 
classes is greater than that for pipelines of lower location classes.   
The 188 data points were grouped by their corresponding location classes.  POI for each 
location class was evaluated as the ratio of the number of ignited ruptures to the number 
of all ruptures in the class.  The results are shown in Table 3.2.  For comparison, the 
average pd2 values for all the ruptures in different location classes are also shown in the 
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table.  Table 3.2 indicates that more than 80% of all ruptures occurred on Class 1 
pipelines and no rupture occurred on Class 4 pipelines.  This is consistent with the fact 
that approximately 80% of the onshore gas transmission pipelines in the US are Class 1 
pipelines and the percentage of Class 4 pipelines is negligibly small (see Chapter 2).  The 
table also indicates that the trend in POI is somewhat unclear as the location class 
increases: the POI for the Class 2 pipelines is the highest whereas the POI for the Class 3 
pipelines is the lowest.  Note that the unclear trend may be partly attributed to the small 
sample sizes for both Class 2 and Class 3 pipelines compared with that for Class 1 
pipelines.  
Table 3.2 Estimated POI with location class for rupture incidents 
Group No. 1 2 3 4 5 
Location Class Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Unknown 
No. of Incidents 156 13 18 0 1 
No. of Ignited Incidents 48 6 3 0 0 
POI 30.8% 46.2% 16.7% - 0.0% 
pd2 Mean (×105 MPa-mm2) 13.6 10.6 3.8 - 2.2 
3.3 Probability of Ignition Model 
3.3.1 Logistic and log-logistic POI models 
The logistic function is widely employed in the literature to characterize the probability 
of a binary outcome corresponding to a set of predictors, for example, the probability of 
detecting a flaw with a given size associated with the non-destructive testing (Zheng and 
Ellingwood 1998) and the likelihood of a person with a given age suffering from a certain 
disease (Hosmer et al. 2013).  In this study, the logistic function was adopted as a 
candidate POI model.  Based on the results of the exploratory data analysis described in 
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Section 3.2, the variable pd2 (MPa-mm2) and the location class Cl (Cl = 1, 2, 3 or 4) were 
selected as the predictors in the logistic POI model, which is given by  
POI  "#$%&$%'()*'+$%,-.  (3.2) 
where α1, α2 and α3 are the model parameters to be evaluated.   
In addition to the logistic function, the log-logistic function (Leemans and Frosyth, 2004; 
Lu et al. 2014) was also considered as a candidate POI model in this study:  
POI  "#$/&$/' 01()*'+$/, 01 -.  (3.3) 
where β1, β2 and β3 are the corresponding model parameters.  The advantage of the log-
logistic model is that POI approaches zero for pd2 close to zero, which physically makes 
sense.   
3.3.2 Maximum likelihood estimation of model parameters 
The maximum likelihood method was employed to evaluate the parameters α1, α2, α3, β1, 
β2 and β3 in Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3) based on the 188 data points collected from the PHMSA 
incident database as described in Section 3.2.  Let D denote a set of n rupture incident 
data.  If ignition occurred in the ith incident (i = 1, 2, ..., n), let λi = 1; otherwise, let λi = 0.  
Further let θ denote the vector of unknown parameters in the POI model to be evaluated 
from D, i.e. θ = (α1, α2, α3) and (β1, β2, β3) for the logistic and log-logistic POI models, 
respectively.  If the incident data are assumed to be mutually independent, the likelihood 
of the data as a function of θ, L(θ|D), is given by (Hosmer et al. 2013) 
234|67  ∏ 3POI79 · 31 ; POI7<9  (3.4) 
where POIi denotes the value of POI for the ith data point and can be obtained by 
substituting the corresponding value of pd2 and Cl (pd2)i and Cli into Eq. (3.2) and Eq. 
(3.3) for the logistic and log-logistic POI model, respectively.  The maximum likelihood 
estimators of θ are the values of θ that maximize Eq. (3.4).  It is preferable to maximize 
  
51 
 
the logarithmic of the likelihood function, i.e. log-likelihood function, as opposed to the 
likelihood function itself.  The log-likelihood function corresponding to Eq. (3.4) is given 
by 
=>(234|?7+  ∑ @=>3ABC7  ∑ 31 ; @7=>31 ; ABC7   (3.5) 
An iterative procedure is needed to evaluate θ that maximizes Eq. (3.5).  In this study, the 
generalized linear model fitting in the general purpose statistical analysis software R was 
employed to compute the maximum likelihood estimators (Maindonald 2008).  The 
results for the logistic and log-logistic POI models are summarized in Table 3.3.   
It is desirable to evaluate if the maximum likelihood estimator of a given parameter is 
significantly different from zero, which sheds light on if pd2 (ln(pd2)) and Cl (ln(Cl)) are 
significantly related to ignition in the logistic (log-logistic) POI model.  The Wald test 
(Hosmer et al. 2013) was adopted to carry out the significance test.  Consider the logistic 
POI model (the Wald test for the log-logistic model follows the same procedure), the 
Wald test statistics, Wi, for a given parameter θi (i = 1, 2 or 3) is as follows: 
D  EF GH(EF+I   (3.6) 
where EF  is the maximum likelihood estimator of θi, and SE(EF+ is the corresponding 
standard error of EF.  For large sample sizes and under the null hypothesis that θi = 0, Wi 
is a standard normal variate (Hosmer et al. 2013).  To obtain an estimator of SE(EF+, the 
observed Fisher information matrix, IF, is obtained first as the negative of the Hessian 
matrix of the log-likelihood function computed at the point of the maximum likelihood 
estimates (Carroll and Ruppert 1988): 
L	  ; M'N 334|?77MOMOP |44Q 3i, j  1, 2, 37 (3.7) 
The estimated variance-covariance matrix of EF  equals the inverse of the Fisher 
information matrix (Carroll and Ruppert 1988).  Finally, the estimator of SE(EF+ equals 
the square root of the corresponding diagonal element of the estimated variance-
  
52 
 
covariance matrix. The values of EF and estimator of SE(EF+ are substituted into Eq. (3.6) 
to calculate a value of Wi, wi.  The null hypothesis of θi = 0 is rejected (i.e. θi ≠ 0) if |wi| > 
Φ
−1(1 - α/2), where Φ−1(•) is the inverse of the standard normal distribution function, and 
α is the two-sided significance level.  In this study, α was selected to equal 0.05, resulting 
in Φ−1(1 - α/2) = 1.96.   
The standard errors of the estimated parameters were obtained using the software R.  The 
Wald test results for the logistic and log-logistic models are summarized in Table 3.3.  
The table shows that the absolute values of the Wald statistics for α3 and β3 are markedly 
smaller than Φ−1(1 - α/2) = 1.96; therefore, the α3 (β3) is considered not significantly 
different from zero and Cl (ln(Cl)) is not significantly related to ignition in the logistic 
(log-logistic) POI model.   
Table 3.3 Maximum likelihood estimates for the logistic and log-logistic POI models 
considering the location class 
Parameter 
Maximum likelihood 
estimator 
Std. Error Wald Statistics 
α1 -2.12 0.50 -4.23 
α2 7.77×10-7 1.52×10-7 5.12 
α3 0.19 0.29 0.65 
β1 -16.17 2.90 -5.58 
β2 1.11 0.21 5.42 
β3 0.65 0.55 1.17 
After eliminating the location class as a predictor, the logistic and log-logistic POI 
models are given by Eqs. (3.8) and (3.9), respectively.   
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POI  "#$%&$%'()*'+  (3.8) 
POI  "#$/&$/' 013)*'7  (3.9) 
The maximum likelihood estimators of α1, α2, β1 and β2 were evaluated to be -1.86, 
7.59×10-7, -15.36 and 1.06, respectively, with the corresponding standard errors equal to 
0.27, 1.47×10-7, 2.73 and 0.20, respectively. 
3.3.3 Goodness-of-fit and confidence interval 
To determine how well Eqs. (3.8) and (3.9) fit the incident data, the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
(HL) method was used to perform the goodness-of-fit test (Hosmer et al. 2013).  The HL 
test involves first sorting the predicted POI values for all the data point in an ascending 
order and then dividing the incident data into several groups such that each group 
contains approximately equal number of data points. The HL test statistics, H, is then 
obtained from the following equation: 
W  ∑ 3X<YZ[\\\\\7'YZ[\\\\\3<YZ[\\\\\7
]
   (3.10) 
where g is the number of groups; Oi is the observed number of ignited incidents in the ith 
group; Ni is total number of incidents (ignited and non-ignited) in the ith group, and POI\\\\\ 
is the average predicted POI for the ith group.  Under the null hypothesis that the 
predicted POI is the same as the observed POI, H asymptotically follows a chi-square 
distribution with (g-2) degrees of freedom (Hosmer et al. 2013).  For a given value of H, 
h, the null hypothesis is accepted if h < ^]< <31 ; _7, where ^]< <3•7 denotes the 
inverse of the probability distribution function of a chi-square distribution with g - 2 
degrees of freedom, and α is the one-sided significance level.  In this study, the incident 
data were divided into ten groups (i.e. g = 10) and α = 0.05 was selected, resulting in 
^]< <31 ; _7 = 15.5.   
The HL tests for the logistic and log-logistic POI models were carried out in R 
(Maindonald 2008).  The results are depicted in Figs. 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), respectively.  A 
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comparison of these two figures suggest that the log-logistic POI model fits the incident 
data better than the logistic POI model.  This is also confirmed by the corresponding HL 
statistics: the h values for the logistic and log-logistic POI models equal 7.91 and 3.84, 
respectively.  Note that both h values are less than ^]< <31 ; _7 = 15.5, indicating that 
both models fit the data well.  However, the h value for the log-logistic model is less than 
that for the logistic model, which indicates that the former model fits the data better than 
the latter model. Given this, Eq. (3.9) was selected as the final proposed POI model, with 
β1 and β2 equal to -15.36 and 1.06, respectively.   
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(a)Logistic model 
 
(b) Log-logistic model 
Figure 3.2 HL test result for the logistic and log-logistic POI models 
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To evaluate the confidence interval on the POI value predicted from Eq. (3.9), the so-
called logit transformation (Hosmer et al. 2013) was applied to POI such that Eq. (3.9) is 
rewritten as 
`  =abc3POI7  ln f YZ[<YZ[g  h  h ln37 (3.11) 
The confidence interval on Y was then utilized to construct the confidence interval on 
POI (Hosmer et al. 2013).  An estimator of Y, F` , is given by  
F`  hi  hi ln37  
and the standard error of F` , SE3 F`7,is given by (Hosmer et al. 2013) 
SE( F`+  fjSE(hi+k  2 ln37 COV(hi, hi+  nln37ojSE(hi+kg
&
'
  (3.12) 
where  COV(hi, hi+ is the covariance of hi and hi.  An estimator of SE3 F`7,  SEp3 F`7, can 
be obtained by substituting the estimators of SE(hi+, SE(hi+ and COV(hi, hi+ in Eq. 
(3.12), all of which are evaluated from the observed Fisher information matrix as 
described in Section 3.3.2.  As F`  asymptotically follows a normal distribution with the 
mean equal to the true value of Y and the standard deviation equal to SE3 F`7 (Hosmer et 
al. 2013), the (1- α)100 percent confidence interval on Y can be estimated as  
 F` q Φ<31 ; s7 ·  SEp3 F`7  (3.13) 
where α is usually set to 0.05, which leads to the 95% confidence interval on Y.  Finally, 
the confidence interval on Y is used to evaluate the corresponding confidence interval on 
POI through Eq. (3.11).   
Based on the above-described method, the 95% confidence interval on POI was 
computed, and the results are depicted in Fig. 3.4.  The data points shown in the figure 
are the same as those shown in Fig. 3.1.  The figure shows that almost all the data points 
are within the 95% confidence interval of the predicted POI, indicating the good 
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predictive capability of Eq. (3.9).  It should be pointed out that the 95% confidence 
interval is asymmetric with respect to the predicted POI curve.  This is because the 
confidence interval on POI is obtained from the (symmetric) confidence interval on Y 
through the logit transformation.  The 95% upper confidence bound on POI, denoted by 
POI95, was also evaluated as a conservative estimate of POI and is shown in Fig. 3.3.  To 
facilitate practical application of POI95, the values of POI95 corresponding to different 
values of pd2 are tabulated in Table 3.4.  The tabulation points in the table are plotted on 
Fig. 3.3, and the values of POI95 corresponding to pd2 values not given in Table 3.4 can 
be estimated from the linear interpolation.   
It is noteworthy that the parameter p in the proposed POI model is the internal pressure at 
the time of rupture.  To predict the probability of ignition for a given pipeline using the 
proposed model, it is suggested that p be replaced by the normal operating pressure of the 
pipeline.  If a conservative estimate of POI is desirable, p can be set at the maximum 
allowable operating pressure of the pipeline.   
 
Figure 3.3 Predicted POI with its 95% confidence interval versus pd2 for the log-
logistic POI model 
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Table 3.4 Look-up table for POI95  
pd2 (×105 MPa-
mm2) 
0.05 2.5 5 7.5 10 15 20 30 40 60 100 
POI95 (%) 1.0 16.7 26.1 33.6 40.0 50.9 59.4 70.9 78.0 85.9 92.4 
3.4 Model Validation and Comparison 
To validate the proposed log-logistic POI model given by Eq. (3.9), the PIPESAFE 
rupture incident data (1970-2004) reported by Acton and Baldwin (2008) were employed.  
Note that the detailed information of individual PIPESAFE data points are confidential 
and therefore unavailable to the present study.  Acton and Baldwin divided the 
PIPESAFE data into four groups and reported the total number of incidents, mean pd2 
value for the incidents and observed POI value for each of the four groups as summarized 
in in Table 3.5.  The mean pd2 value for each incident group was then substituted into Eq. 
(3.9) to evaluate POI and 95% confidence interval on POI using the proposed log-logistic 
model.  The results are shown in Table 3.5.  The table shows that the predicted POI 
values are in reasonable agreement with the observed POI values.  The proposed model 
overestimates POI for the incident group with pd2 between 10 and 30 (×105 MPa-mm2) 
and somewhat underestimates POI for the incident group with pd2 between 30 and 100 
(×105 MPa-mm2).  This could be attributed to two factors: 1) the sample sizes in these 
two groups are relatively small, and 2) the regional differences between the PIPESAFE 
data, the majority of which come from European pipeline operators, and the PHMSA data 
on which the proposed POI model is based.   
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Table 3.5 PIPESAFE rupture incident data (1970-2004) with corresponding 
predicted POI values by the proposed POI model 
pd2 Range 
(×105 MPa-
mm2) 
Mean pd2 for the 
incidents (×105 MPa-
mm2) 
No. of 
Incidents 
Observed 
POI 
Predicted 
POI 
95% 
confidence 
Interval 
0 to 1 0.4 78 0.05 0.02 (0.01, 0.05) 
1 to 10 3.6 77 0.13 0.14 (0.09, 0.21) 
10 to 30 17.6 44 0.34 0.47 (0.39, 0.56) 
30 to 100 48.2 29 0.83 0.72 (0.60, 0.82) 
The proposed log-logistic POI model is compared with the simple linear regression POI 
model given by Eq. (3.1) in Fig. 3.5.  The “PIPESAFE 70-96”, “PIPESAFE 70-04” and 
“PIPESAFE 70-04 + PHMSA 02-07” curves in the figure represent the linear regression 
POI models fitted using different sets of pipeline rupture incident data as described in 
Section 3.1.  The figure shows that unlike the bilinear characteristic of the linear 
regression POI models the log-logistic POI model is characterized by a single smooth 
curve and naturally bounded by zero and unity.  Furthermore, the POI values obtained 
from the log-logistic model are higher than those from the linear regression models for 
pd2 values between 3 and 40 (×105 MPa-mm2) and somewhat lower than those from the 
linear regression models for pd2 values between 40 and 70 (×105 MPa-mm2).  For pd2 
values between 70 and 100 (×105 MPa-mm2), the POI values obtained from the log-
logistic model are close to the upper bound of the linear regression models.   
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Figure 3.4 Proposed POI model compared with simple linear regression POI model 
3.5 Conclusions 
A total of 188 rupture incidents that occurred on onshore natural gas transmission 
pipelines in the US between 2002 and 2014 were identified from the PHMSA pipeline 
incident database to develop a POI model given rupture of gas pipelines.  Fifty-nine of 
those incidents involved ignition.  Both the logistic and log-logistic functions were 
considered for the POI model.  The predictors considered in the model include the 
location class of the pipeline and product of the internal pressure at the time of incident 
and outside diameter of the pipeline squared, i.e. pd2, which is directly related to the 
initial gas outflow after a rupture.  The maximum likelihood method was employed to 
evaluate the parameters of the POI models.  It was observed that pd2 is strongly 
correlated with POI, whereas the location class is not strongly correlated with POI.  The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test suggests that the log-logistic POI model fits the PHMSA incident 
data better than the logistic POI model; therefore, the log-logistic POI model with pd2 as 
the sole predictor was selected as the proposed POI model.   
The 95% confidence interval and 95% upper confidence bound on the predicted POI 
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confidence bound on POI corresponding to different values of pd2 were tabulated in a 
look-up table.  To validate the proposed POI model, the POI values predicted by the 
model were compared with the observed POI values for four groups of PIPESAFE 
rupture incidents reported in the open literature.  The comparison indicates that the 
predicted and observed POI values are in reasonable agreement; the discrepancy may be 
attributed to the regional differences between the PIPESAFE incidents (mostly in 
Europe) and PHMSA incidents.   
The proposed POI model is more advantageous than the simple linear regression-based 
POI model reported in the literature in that the former is naturally bounded by zero and 
unity, and associated with desirable statistical properties such as the confidence interval 
and upper confidence bound.  To apply the proposed POI model in the quantitative risk 
assessment of a given pipeline, it is suggested that the internal pressure at the time of the 
incident be replaced by the normal operating pressure, or by the maximum allowable 
operating pressure if a conservative estimate of POI is preferred.   
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Chapter 4  
Quantitative Risk Assessment of a Hypothetical Onshore 
Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline 
4.1 Introduction 
Quantitative risk assessments of oil and gas pipelines are becoming more and more 
accepted by pipeline operators as an integral component of the pipeline integrity 
management program.  The risks posed by natural gas pipelines are mostly related to the 
human safety. Two well-known quantitative risk measures in terms of the human safety 
are the societal and individual risks (TNO Purple Book 1999; Tomic et al. 2014).  The 
societal risk associated with a given pipeline characterizes the aggregate risk over a group 
of people living near the pipeline, whereas the individual risk associated with the pipeline 
characterizes the risk the pipeline poses to a given individual who happens to be in its 
vicinity.   
The objective of the study reported in this chapter is to conduct the quantitative risk 
assessment of a hypothetical onshore natural gas pipeline, by employing the pipeline 
failure statistics reported in Chapter 2 and the probability of ignition (POI) model 
proposed in Chapter 3.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 describes the methodologies 
for evaluating the societal and individual risk levels associated with natural gas pipelines.  
The risk assessment of a hypothetical gas pipeline is described in Section 4.3, followed 
by summary and conclusions in Section 4.4.   
4.2 Methodologies for Risk Assessments 
4.2.1 Thermal Radiation Effect of an Ignited Rupture 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are typically three failure modes associated with an 
onshore gas pipeline: leak, puncture and full-bore rupture.  A non-ignited failure of a gas 
pipeline has a negligible impact on the safety of the population in the vicinity of the 
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pipeline.  On the other hand, the human safety-related consequences associated with 
ignited ruptures can be very severe and typically much greater than those associated with 
ignited leaks and punctures.  Therefore, the risk assessments presented in this chapter are 
with respect to ignited ruptures.  An ignited rupture of a gas pipeline emits thermal 
radiation to the area surrounding the rupture site, which may cause burn injuries and 
fatalities depending on the thermal load received by the population within the area.  The 
thermal load is a function of the exposure time and thermal radiation intensity (Lees 
1996).  Given an ignited rupture, it is involved to carry out detailed evaluations of the 
thermal load received by each individual impacted by the rupture as the evaluation needs 
to take account of the distance between the individual and rupture site, shape, nature and 
extent of the fire, the atmospheric transmissivity between the fire and the individual as 
determined by the humidity, escape speed of the individual, and availability of shelters in 
the immediate vicinity of the individual (Acton et al. 2002).  In this study, a widely 
accepted simplified model, namely the C-FER model (Stephens 2002), was adopted to 
evaluate the thermal radiation hazard zone associated with an ignited rupture.  The C-
FER model assumes a double-ended gas release for a rupture with the diameter of the 
release hole at each end equal to the pipe diameter.  The radius of the circular thermal 
radiation hazard area, rh (m), within which the heat intensity level exceeds a certain 
threshold, Ith (kW/m2), is given by   
tu  vw.yz{|'}~  (4.1) 
where p (MPa) is the pipeline pressure at the time of rupture and d (mm) is the pipeline 
outside diameter.  Therefore, the radius of the thermal radiation hazard zone due to an 
ignited rupture incident can be determined from the pressure, diameter and thermal 
radiation intensity threshold using the C-FER model.   
By assuming a typical exposure time of 30 s (Rothwell and Stephens 2006), the values of 
Ith corresponding to the onset of burn injury, 0% lethality and 100% lethality for people 
under outdoor exposure were chosen to be 5.05, 12.62 and 31.55 kW/m2, respectively, 
based on previous studies reported in the literature (Eisenberg et al. 1975; Hymes 1983; 
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Bilo and Kinsman 1997).  The lethality associated with a given location that is within the 
annulus bounded by the 0% and 100% lethality is obtained from linear interpolation for 
simplicity.   
For the indoor exposure condition, wooden structures are unlikely to ignite with a thermal 
radiation intensity lower than 15.77 kW/m2, and hence should afford indefinite protection 
to occupants (Bilo & Kinsman 1997; Stephens 2002).  If the thermal radiation intensity is 
greater than 31.55 kW/m2, such structures will ignite fast (not more than 65 seconds) and 
provide no protection after ignition (Bilo and Kinsman 1997; Stephens 2002).  The values 
of Ith corresponding to 0% and 100% probabilities of ignition of a wooden structure were 
therefore chosen to be 15.77 and 31.55 kW/m2, respectively.  The probability of ignition 
of a wooden structure associated with a given location that is within the annulus bounded 
by the 0% and 100% probabilities is obtained from linear interpolation for simplicity.  
Given ignition of a wooden structure, people inside the structure were assumed to be able 
to escape outdoors and then subjected to the outdoor exposure; therefore, the values of Ith, 
corresponding to the outdoor exposure condition are applicable.  The selected values of 
Ith and corresponding implications for the human safety for the outdoor and indoor 
exposure conditions are summarized in Figs. 4.1(a) and 4.1(b), respectively.  Note that 
r12.62, r15.77 and r31.55 in these figures denote the radii of the circular thermal radiation 
hazard areas corresponding to the heat intensity levels of 12.62, 15.77 and 31.55 kW/m2, 
respectively.   
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(a) Outdoor exposure 
 
(b) Indoor exposure 
Figure 4.1 Thermal radiation intensity thresholds and human safety implications 
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4.2.2 Societal Risk 
The societal risk can be represented by the expected number of casualties per km-year 
(Nessim et al. 2009) and the so-called F-N curve (TNO Purple Book 1999).  Note that the 
F-N curve is defined as the frequency (i.e. F) of incidents causing N (N = 1, 2, ...) or more 
casualties, and typically plotted on a log-log scale with the vertical and horizontal axes 
representing F and N, respectively.   
The societal risk in terms of the expected number of casualties per km-year associated 
with a given location, x, on a gas pipeline can be calculated as follows:   
37  37 · POI · 37 (4.2) 
where Fr(x) is the probability of rupture of the pipeline at location x (per km-year), POI is 
the probability of ignition given rupture, and Cs(x) is the weighted average number of 
casualties caused by an ignited rupture at x.  Note that Fr(x) can be evaluated from 
structural reliability analyses if probabilistic information about the pipeline and threats 
are available.  Otherwise, historical pipeline failure statistics such as those reported in 
Chapter 2 can be used to estimate Fr(x).  The value of POI can be obtained from the log-
logistic POI model (Eq. 3.9) developed in Chapter 3.   
To plot the F-N curve for a given one-kilometer long segment of the pipeline, the pipeline 
segment is first divided into n equal-length sections.  The probability of ignited rupture 
per year, f(j), of the jth (j=1, 2, …, n) section is then calculated as follows:   
37  37 · POI (4.3) 
where fr(j) is the annual probability of rupture of the jth section.  The frequency of ignited 
ruptures causing N (N = 1, 2, ...) or more casualties, F(N), for the one-kilometer pipeline 
segment is given by 
37  ∑ 3737  3  1, 2, … , >;    1, 2, … 7 (4.4) 
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where N(j) is the number of casualties caused by the ignited rupture of the jth section.  In 
estimating N(j), the rupture site is assumed to be at the mid-point of the jth section.  It 
should be noted that given the rarity of pipeline incidents, the frequency of rupture per 
km-year is equivalent to the probability of rupture per km-year.   
4.2.3 Individual Risk 
Different from the evaluation of the societal risk, the individual risk is quantified as the 
annual probability of casualty (i.e. fatality or injury) imposed on an individual located 
near the pipeline by the pipeline interaction length, l, as shown in Fig. 4.2.  An ignited 
rupture of the pipeline within the interaction length will affect the individual.  The 
interaction length l can be calculated as 2(rmax2 – y2)0.5 for y ≤ rmax, where rmax (m) is the 
maximum impact radius given an ignited rupture and y (m) is the offset distance of the 
individual from the pipeline.  In this study, the maximum impact radii given an ignited 
rupture are the radii of the circular thermal radiation hazard areas corresponding to the 
heat intensity levels 5.05 and 15.77 kW/m2, respectively, for outdoor and indoor 
individuals.  The risk for an individual near the pipeline can be calculated as follows.   
37   37 · POI · 3, 7Nw , for y ≤ rmax; (4.5a) 
37  0, for y > rmax. (4.5b) 
where Fr(z) is the probability of rupture of the pipeline at location z (per km-year), and 
Ci(z, y) is the probability of burn jury and lethality to the individual having an offset 
distance y from the pipeline caused by an ignited rupture at z (0 ≤ z ≤ l) within the 
pipeline interaction length.  Given the values of z and y (see Fig. 4.2), the distance 
between the individual and the rupture location z can be calculated as [(l/2 – z)2 + y2]0.5 
and then Ci(z, y) can be determined using Figs. 4.1(a) and 4.1(b), respectively, for the 
outdoor and indoor exposure conditions.  In this study, the individual risk was computed 
numerically by assigning a unit length (1 m) to dz.   
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Figure 4.2 Interaction length for individual risk with offset distance y  
4.3 Hypothetical Example 
4.3.1 General 
A hypothetical natural gas transmission pipeline is employed to illustrate the quantitative 
risk assessment procedure described in Section 4.2.  The pipeline has a nominal pipe 
diameter (NPS) of 24 inches (609.6 mm), and an operating pressure of 6.0 MPa.  
Approximately 2.3 km of the pipeline traverses a residential area that consists of many 
single-family houses (SglFamily), one meeting and recreation facility (MtgRecF), one 
school and several playgrounds (PlayGrnd). The route of the pipeline and its surrounding 
buildings in the residential area are shown in Fig. 4.3.   
l
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Safe
y
Individual
rmax
Rupture location
z
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Figure 4.3 Illustration of a hypothetical pipeline and its sourroudings 
The historical pipeline failure statistics obtained from the PHMSA incident database as 
reported in Chapter 2 were used to evaluate the probability of rupture of the example 
pipeline.  The 12-year average rupture rate of pipelines with diameter 20 < d ≤ 28 inches 
due to all failure causes combined was estimated to be 2.5 × 10-5 per km-year in Chapter 
2.  This value was selected as the representative rupture rate for the example pipeline.  
The value of POI given rupture for the example pipeline was evaluated to be 0.53 by 
substituting the operating pressure of 6.0 MPa and diameter of 609.6 mm into Eq. (3.9).  
The radii of the circular thermal radiation hazard areas in Fig. 4.1 corresponding to the 
threshold heat intensity levels 31.55, 15.77, 12.62 and 5.05 kW/m2 are equal to 105, 148, 
165 and 261 m, respectively.   
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To evaluate the societal risk posed by the example pipeline, the number of occupants in 
each of the four different types of facilities (i.e. single-family house, meeting and 
recreating facility, school and playground) indicated in Fig. 4.3 needs to be estimated.  
The average number of people living in a single-family house was assumed to be 2.9 
based on the 2011 Census Report of Statistics Canada (Milan & Bohnert 2012).  It is 
further assumed that the occupants are present in the house on average 50% of the time.  
It follows that the expected number of occupants in the house at the time of the pipeline 
rupture equals 1.5.  The average number of people occupying the meeting and recreation 
facility was arbitrarily assumed to be 100, and the facility was assumed to open eight 
hours a day and seven days a week.  Therefore, the expected number of occupants in the 
facility at the time of rupture equals 100 × 8/24 = 33.3.  The average number of people in 
the school was assumed to be 400 based on the information provided by the Council of 
Ministers of Education, Canada (accessed from http://www.cmec.ca/299/Education-in-
Canada-An-Overview/ on 20th January, 2015), and the school was assumed to be open 
eight hours a day and five days a week.  Therefore, the expected number of occupants at 
the time of rupture equals 400 × 8/24 × 5/7 = 95.2.  The playground was assumed to be 
on average occupied by 20 people for eight hours a day; therefore, the expected number 
of occupants at the time of rupture equals 20 × 8/24 = 6.7.  Finally, it was assumed that 
the people in the playground at the time of rupture are subjected to the outdoor exposure, 
while those in the single-family house, meeting and recreation facility and school are 
subjected to the indoor exposure.  A summary of the above assumptions for different 
facilities is shown in Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.1 Summary of assumptions for different facilities 
Type of facility Number of occupants 
Expected number of 
occupants at the time of 
rupture 
Exposure type 
SglFamily 2.9 1.5 Indoor 
MtgRecF 100 33.3 Indoor 
School 400 95.2 Indoor 
Playgrnd 20 6.7 Outdoor 
To evaluate the individual risk, it is conservatively assumed that an individual is present 
in the invicinity of the pipeline 100% of the time.  The individual risk levles 
corresponding to both the outdoor and indoor exposures were evaluated.   
4.3.2 Results of Risk Analyses 
The quantified societal risk in terms of the expected number of casualties is shown in Fig. 
4.4.  The figure shows that that the societal risk level in terms of the expected number of 
fatalities are the lowest at x approximately equal to 1200 and 1800 m, and relatively high 
at x of around 500, 900 and 1400 m.  This can be explained by the distribution of 
buildings around the pipeline.  In Fig. 4.3, at x around 1200 and 1800 m, nearby buildings 
are located relatively farther (> 200 m) from the pipeline compared to other portions of 
the pipeline.  For x around 500, 900 and 1400 m, the closest buildings are only about 100 
m away from the pipeline, and thus the societal risk levels in terms of the expected 
number of fatalities in the locations are relatively high.  The variation of the societal risk 
level in terms of the expected number of casualties (i.e. fatalities plus injuries) along the 
pipeline location is similar to that of the societal risk level in terms of the expected 
number of fatalities.  The highest societal risk level in terms of the expected number of 
fatalities is estimated to be 4.9 × 10-5 per km-year, while the highest societal risk level in 
terms of the expected number of casualties is estimated to be 7.8 × 10-5 per km-year.  
  
74 
 
From Figs. 4.3 and 4.4, it can be inferred that the societal risk level is largely influenced 
by the relative locations between the pipeline and its surrounding buildings.  If the offset 
distances of the buildings south of the pipeline are increased by just 5 m, the estimated 
highest societal risk level in terms of the expected number of fatalities can be lowered to 
3.3 × 10-5 per km-year, a 33% reduction of the risk level.   
  
Figure 4.4 Societal risk level in terms of the expected number of casualites 
The quantified societal risk level in terms of the F-N curve per km is plotted in Fig. 4.5.  
Note that the F-N curve per km in this example was evaluated as follows: the F-N curve 
for the first one-km pipeline segment that starts at x = 0.261 km was evaluated; then the 
F-N curve for the next one-km segment that starts at x = 0.461 km was evaluated, and so 
on.  Only the F-N curve in terms of fatality was investigated and a total of five F-N 
curves were computed as a result.  Figure 4.5 shows that the F-N curves intercept each 
other and as a result it is not possible to identify a single most critical F-N curve over the 
entire range of N.  However, the F-N curve corresponding to the first one-km segment 
envelopes the other F-N curves for N ≥ 2.   
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Figure 4.5 Societal risk level in terms of F-N curve 
The quantified individual risks for the outdoor and indoor exposures are shown in Fig. 
4.6.  The indivdual risk is a function of the offset distance, y, of the individual from the 
pipeline.  The figures show that the offset distance beyond which the individual risk 
becomes zero equals 261 and 148 m, for the outdoor and indoor exposures, respectively.  
The highest individual fatality risks equal 3.6 × 10-6 and 3.2× 10-6 per year, respectively, 
for the outdoor and indoor exposures, and the hightest individual casualty risks equal 7.0 
× 10-6 and 3.4× 10-6 per year, for the outdoor and indoor exposures, respectively.   
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Figure 4.6 Individual risk levels for outdoor and indoor exposures 
4.4 Conclusions 
The methodologies for quantifying the risks in terms of the human safety due to ignited 
ruptures of onshore gas transmission pipelines are discussed in this chapter.  The well-
known C-FER model was adopted to evaluate the radii of the thermal radiation hazard 
areas resulting from ignited ruptures of onshore gas pipelines.  According to this model, 
the radius of the thermal radiation hazard area can be evaluated from the pressure and 
diameter of the pipeline, and the heat intensity threshold corresponding to a given degree 
of burn injury to humans.  Based on the literature review, the heat intensity thresholds 
corresponding to the onset of burn injury, 0% lethality and 100% lethality were selected 
to 5.05, 12.62 and 31.55 kW/m2, respectively, for the outdoor exposure condition.  For 
the indoor exposure condition, the heat intensity thresholds corresponding to 0% and 
100% probabilities of ignition of a wooden structure were selected to be 15.77 and 31.55 
kW/m2, respectively.  It is assumed that a wooden structure is able to afford indefinite 
protection to its occupants for heat intensity levels less than 15.77 kW/m2.  Given ignition 
of a wooden structure, its occupants were further assumed to escape outdoors and subject 
to outdoor exposure.   
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Both the societal and individual risks are considered.  The societal risk is represented by 
the expected number of casualties per km-year as well as the F-N curve for any one-km 
segment of the pipeline.  The individual risk is represented by the annual probability of 
casualty for an individual in the vicinity of the pipeline.  Quantitative risk assessments of 
a hypothetical onshore gas transmission pipeline were carried out to illustrate the 
methodologies.  The pipeline was assumed to have an outside diameter of 609.6 mm and 
operating pressure of 6.0 MPa, and cross a residential area that is approximately 2.3 km 
long.  The probability of rupture per km-year of the pipeline was estimated based on the 
historic failure statistics summarized in Chapter 2, whereas POI given rupture of the 
pipeline was evaluated from the log-logistic POI model proposed in Chapter 3.  The 
analysis results indicate that the societal risk in terms of the expected number of 
casualties and F-N curve varies along the pipeline, due to the different locations and 
types of the buildings or facilities intended for human occupants along the pipeline.  For 
this particular example, a slight increase in the offset distance by 5 m resulted in a 33% 
reduction in the maximum societal risk in terms of the expected number of fatalities.  The 
individual risk is a function of the indoor and outdoor exposure condition as well as the 
offset distance of the individual with respect to the pipeline.   
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Chapter 5  Summary and Conclusions 
5.1 Statistical Analyses of PHMSA data 
To provide insights into the current state of gas transmission pipelines in the US and 
derive relevant failure statistics as the baseline failure probabilities for carrying out 
system-wide risk assessments of pipelines, statistical analyses of incidents on onshore gas 
transmission pipelines were carried out based on the PHMSA database.  The mileage and 
pipe-related incident data corresponding to onshore gas transmission pipelines in the US 
between 2002 and 2013 were investigated.  The format of the incident data of 2002-2009 
is different from that of the incident data of 2010-2013; therefore, the two sets of data 
were aggregated according to sets of failure causes or failure modes adopted in this study.  
The adopted failure causes include the internal and external corrosions (IC and EC), 
third-party excavation (TPE), material failure (MF), first- and second-party excavation 
(FSPE), previously damage pipe (PDP), vehicle not engaged in excavation (V) and others 
(O).  The failure modes were categorized as leak, puncture, and rupture and other.   
The total lengths of the onshore gas transmission pipelines in the US from 2002 to 2003 
varied between 470,000 and 480,000 km, and the total length remained around 480,000 
km since 2009.  Newer pipelines gradually replaced older pipelines with time as 
expected, however, approximately 60% of the pipelines were more than 45 years old as 
of 2013.  About 80% of pipelines are in Class 1 areas, whereas about 20% of pipelines 
are in Class 2 and Class 3 areas with less than 1% of pipelines being in Class 4 areas.  
Almost all pipelines are steel pipelines, about 98% of which are cathodically protected 
and coated (CC).   
The analyses of the pipeline incident data identified the third party excavation (26.3%), 
external corrosion (23.7%), material failure (16.8%) and internal corrosion (8.4%) as the 
main failure causes.  TPE- or IC-caused incidents occurred mostly on pipelines with 
small or medium diameters (i.e. 4 < d ≤ 20 inches), whereas EC- or MF-caused incidents 
occurred mostly on pipelines with medium or large diameters (i.e. d > 10 inches).  The 
pipes or field-welding or both in the 1950s may be of relatively poor quality given the 
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fact that the percentage of the MF-caused incidents having occurred on pipelines installed 
in the 1950s were disproportionately higher than the contribution of such pipelines to the 
total mileage.  A significant portion of the TPE-caused incidents occurred on Class 3 
pipelines.  Rupture is the most common failure mode with 38% of the incidents resulting 
in ruptures, while 30 and 20% of the incidents resulted in leak and puncture, respectively.  
The average probability of ignition given a rupture, leak or puncture equals 30, 3 or 10%, 
respectively.  Seventy-five and eighty-three percents, respectively, of a total of 16 
fatalities and 75 injuries resulting from the 464 pipe-related incidents between 2002 and 
2013 were caused by rupture incidents.   
The analyses of rupture incident rates (per km-year) were conducted using the mileage 
and incident data for onshore gas transmission pipelines.  The 12-year average rupture 
rate equals 3.1 × 10-5 per km-year due to all failure causes combined.  EC is the leading 
cause for rupture of all pipelines installed in the 1960s or earlier.  The three-year moving 
average rupture rate due to TPE gradually decreased since 2007 and that due to EC and 
MF, respectively, decreased and increased since 2009.  The TPE-caused rupture rate is 
markedly higher on Class 3 pipelines than on Class 1 and Class 2 pipelines, suggesting 
the safety factor adopted in the design code for Class 3 pipelines may be inadequate in 
terms of preventing the third-party excavation damage.   
5.2 Probability of Ignition Model Development 
The logistic and log-logistic functions with two predictors, which are the location class of 
the pipeline and the product of the internal pressure at the time of incident and outside 
diameter of the pipeline squared (pd2), were considered as the candidate probability of 
ignition (POI) models for ruptures of onshore gas transmission pipelines.  A total of 188 
rupture incidents, 59 out of them being ignited incidents, of onshore gas transmission 
pipelines in the US between 2002 and 2004 were collected from the PHMSA pipeline 
incident database to develop the POI models.  The model parameters were estimated 
using the maximum likelihood method, and the pd2 was found to be strongly correlated 
with POI but the location class was not.  According to the Hosmer-Lemeshow test, the 
log-logistic POI model was found to be better than the logistic POI model in terms of 
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fitting the data set. Therefore the former model was selected as the final proposed POI 
model with pd2 as the sole predictor in the model.  
The 95% confidence interval and 95% upper confidence bound for the proposed POI 
model were evaluated and the latter was tabulated in a look-up table to facilitate the 
practical application of the proposed POI model.  A set of observed POI values for four 
groups of PIPESAFE rupture incidents reported in the open literature was used to 
validate the proposed POI model.  The results show that the model predictions agree 
reasonably well with the observed POI values, and the regional differences between the 
PIPESAFE incidents (mostly in Europe) and PHMSA incidents may give rise to the 
discrepancy between them.   
The proposed POI model overcomes the drawbacks associated with the simple linear 
regression-based POI model reported in the literature in that it has natural probability 
properties and statistics such as the confidence interval and upper confidence bound for 
practical application.   
5.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment of Onshore Gas 
Pipelines 
The rupture incident rates obtained in Chapter 2 and the log-logistic POI model proposed 
in Chapter 3 were incorporated in the practical application of the quantitative risk 
assessment for a hypothetical onshore gas transmission pipeline presented in Chapter 4.  
The quantitative risk assessment considered the societal and individual risks posed by the 
pipeline on the population located in the vicinity of the pipeline.  The societal risk was 
evaluated in terms of the expected number of casualties and F-N curve, while the 
individual risk was evaluated as the annual probability of casualty for a given individual 
located near the pipeline.  The size of the thermal radiation hazard zone given an ignited 
rupture for the outdoor and indoor exposure conditions was evaluated using the well-
known CFER model and selected thermal radiation thresholds corresponding to different 
levels of burn injury.  Based on the rupture incident rates, log-logistic POI model and 
thermal radiation hazard model, the societal and individual risks were computed.  In the 
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calculation of the societal risk, the average number of occupants and likelihood of 
presence of the occupants for the single family house, meeting and recreation facility, 
school and playground were assumed based on the information in the literature.   
The societal risk was observed to be related with the relative locations between the 
pipeline and its surrounding buildings.  The individual risk is a function of the offset 
distance between the individual and the pipeline, and the risk decreases as the offset 
distance increases.   
5.4 Recommendations for future study 
Recommendations for future work are as follows: 
1. Statistical analyses of incidents on liquid transmission pipelines can be carried out 
to gain insights into main failure causes and failure modes.  Furthermore, a 
comparative study can be carried out to evaluate the safety and reliability of 
transmission pipelines in comparison with other modes (such as rail) of 
transporting large quantities of liquid hydrocarbons.   
2. The probability of ignition for ruptures of liquid transmission pipelines needs to 
be investigated.  Furthermore, the probabilities of ignition for puncture of gas and 
liquid transmission pipelines should also be examined.   
3. The failure consequences of transmission pipelines in terms of the property 
damage, environmental impact and business interruption can be studied based on 
the PHMSA incident data, which will provide crucial input for determining the 
optimal maintenance strategies for onshore pipelines.   
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Appendix A 
Detailed Information of PHMSA Rupture Incidents for 
Developing the POI Model 
Table A.1  
RPTID d /mm 
p 
/MPa 
MAOP 
/MPa Cl Ig. RPTID 
d 
/mm 
p 
/MPa 
MAOP 
/MPa Cl Ig. 
20020026 660.4 4.6 5.2 2 Y 20080017 609.6 3.1 3.4 1 N 
20020030 914.4 6.6 6.7 1 N 20080035 273.1 6.6 6.9 1 N 
20020036 508.0 4.7 5.4 1 N 20080080 273.1 2.8 3.4 1 N 
20020053 406.4 4.3 4.5 1 N 20080081 168.3 2.6 3.4 3 N 
20020062 168.3 2.8 3.3 1 N 20080090 762.0 5.5 5.5 1 Y 
20020069 762.0 5.2 6.5 1 Y 20080093 273.1 5.9 6.9 3 N 
20020090 762.0 5.7 5.9 1 N 20080094 914.4 7.2 7.2 1 Y 
20020091 273.1 4.4 6.1 1 N 20080095 609.6 5.7 6.2 1 N 
20020096 762.0 4.9 7.1 1 N 20080143 355.6 6.8 6.9 1 N 
20030001 406.4 2.4 2.6 3 N 20080146 323.9 2.7 3.1 1 N 
20030002 273.1 2.4 3.4 1 N 20090010 168.3 11.7 12.4 1 N 
20030005 914.4 5.8 5.8 1 Y 20090012 168.3 3.6 5.5 1 N 
20030017 609.6 5.6 6.7 1 Y 20090022 323.9 4.6 6.9 3 N 
20030020 168.3 6.2 7.4 3 N 20090023 406.4 6.6 7.2 3 Y 
20030021 323.9 5.0 5.5 1 Y 20090030 609.6 5.4 5.5 1 N 
20030022 406.4 5.6 5.7 1 Y 20090056 219.1 3.0 5.7 1 N 
20030024 219.1 0.9 1.0 1 N 20090059 457.2 5.9 6.0 1 N 
20030028 323.9 4.4 4.7 1 Y 20090061 609.6 5.4 5.5 1 Y 
20030041 457.2 2.3 3.2 1 N 20090066 101.6 6.3 6.7 3 N 
20030050 660.4 4.3 4.6 1 N 20090071 406.4 6.4 7.5 1 N 
20030061 762.0 5.1 5.6 1 Y 20090075 508.0 4.0 4.5 1 N 
20030065 762.0 6.4 6.9 1 Y 20090078 273.1 8.2 9.0 1 N 
20030076 660.4 4.7 5.0 1 N 20090080 508.0 1.7 2.6 1 N 
20030087 168.3 14.6 15.2 1 N 20090107 114.3 4.7 5.2 1 N 
20030091 609.6 5.5 5.5 2 N 20090119 406.4 5.4 7.8 1 N 
20030094 219.1 4.8 5.3 3 N 20090133 406.4 6.1 6.6 1 N 
20030095 762.0 6.2 6.9 1 Y 20090135 323.9 2.9 3.4 1 N 
20040004 660.4 4.3 4.5 1 Y 20090141 508.0 1.2 1.5 2 N 
20040005 508.0 2.6 2.8 1 N 20100002 609.6 5.1 5.2 2 N 
20040031 914.4 4.8 4.9 1 Y 20100012 406.4 4.4 5.0 1 N 
20040032 114.3 4.1 4.5 1 N 20100013 406.4 5.4 6.2 1 N 
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20040035 406.4 5.4 5.5 1 Y 20100014 660.4 3.8 4.1 1 Y 
20040053 168.3 7.3 7.5 1 N 20100050 914.4 6.6 7.2 1 N 
20040072 323.9 5.1 6.6 1 N 20100051 219.1 3.6 4.0 1 N 
20040086 508.0 4.6 4.6 1 N 20100068 508.0 2.0 2.0 1 N 
20040104 508.0 4.0 7.1 1 N 20100070 762.0 2.7 2.8 3 Y 
20040109 323.9 4.1 5.7 3 N 20100090 508.0 3.8 3.8 1 N 
20040113 323.9 8.5 7.1 1 N 20100110 508.0 5.6 6.3 1 N 
20040117 609.6 5.9 6.0 1 N 20110002 609.6 4.9 5.2 1 N 
20050001 323.9 3.9 5.0 1 N 20110010 168.3 4.4 5.5 1 N 
20050007 141.3 1.4 1.8 1 N 20110026 914.4 5.1 5.4 1 Y 
20050008 127.0 3.1 4.2 1 N 20110038 508.0 1.0 7.2 1 N 
20050009 219.1 1.6 3.4 1 N 20110202 508.0 3.7 4.0 1 N 
20050011 508.0 2.2 8.4 1 N 20110231 323.9 2.4 3.4 2 N 
20050015 219.1 6.5 9.9 1 Y 20110267 219.1 6.7 8.4 1 N 
20050022 219.1 1.9 2.1 1 N 20110294 762.0 9.2 9.9 1 N 
20050026 219.1 2.6 3.8 3 N 20110389 60.3 13.4 16.5 1 Y 
20050036 863.6 4.4 5.3 1 Y 20110392 914.4 5.4 5.5 1 Y 
20050049 558.8 3.0 3.1 1 N 20110393 914.4 5.2 5.4 1 Y 
20050058 762.0 6.6 6.7 1 N 20120006 508.0 5.8 4.2 1 N 
20050062 406.4 1.2 1.4 1 N 20120011 762.0 6.3 6.9 1 Y 
20050065 914.4 5.7 5.9 1 Y 20120028 762.0 6.7 6.7 1 N 
20050077 508.0 3.6 3.1 1 N 20120038 60.3 1.9 2.0 3 N 
20050088 508.0 6.7 7.2 1 N 20120041 323.9 3.0 3.4 1 N 
20050089 406.4 3.7 5.0 1 N 20120046 406.4 6.4 8.9 1 Y 
20050122 273.1 1.5 2.6 3 N 20120055 406.4 4.4 6.6 1 Y 
20050176 219.1 6.2 9.9 1 Y 20120056 406.4 7.8 6.9 1 Y 
20060003 323.9 2.3 2.4 1 N 20120058 168.3 6.3 8.3 1 N 
20060024 508.0 5.9 6.3 1 N 20120066 660.4 4.8 5.0 1 Y 
20060048 33.4 2.8 3.1 2 N 20120086 273.1 8.6 9.5 1 Y 
20060076 13.7 0.3 20.7 1 N 20120087 323.9 4.3 5.1 3 Y 
20060077 219.1 3.0 3.0 1 N 20120099 406.4 6.6 6.9 1 N 
20060079 323.9 2.1 2.3 - N 20120100 406.4 7.2 6.9 1 Y 
20060093 406.4 6.1 6.3 1 N 20120112 168.3 0.9 2.1 2 N 
20060104 609.6 4.9 5.2 2 Y 20120123 219.1 5.2 5.4 1 N 
20060121 323.9 4.2 5.6 1 N 20120128 406.4 3.3 4.2 1 Y 
20060126 508.0 4.6 5.0 1 Y 20130001 508.0 6.4 6.9 2 Y 
20060129 508.0 4.5 6.6 1 N 20130007 508.0 6.4 6.5 1 N 
20060134 609.6 4.8 5.5 1 N 20130019 323.9 2.6 3.4 1 N 
20070008 609.6 4.5 5.9 1 N 20130021 323.9 4.4 4.9 1 N 
20070026 457.2 2.1 3.3 3 N 20130043 508.0 5.8 7.3 1 N 
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20070027 508.0 2.1 4.9 2 N 20130055 168.3 2.4 3.1 3 N 
20070028 114.3 4.2 11.3 1 N 20130064 323.9 5.6 6.0 1 N 
20070030 787.4 4.0 5.2 1 Y 20130066 762.0 6.6 6.7 1 Y 
20070041 219.1 1.3 1.8 1 N 20130071 127.0 5.6 6.3 1 N 
20070054 323.9 5.8 7.5 1 N 20130077 219.1 10.2 10.8 3 N 
20070064 558.8 5.4 5.5 1 Y 20130081 323.9 5.6 6.9 1 N 
20070066 273.1 5.5 6.7 1 N 20130084 219.1 5.5 6.5 1 N 
20070074 323.9 2.3 3.2 1 N 20130088 323.9 7.7 8.3 1 Y 
20070096 219.1 1.2 5.0 1 N 20130099 762.0 5.6 5.9 1 Y 
20070097 508.0 7.5 7.4 1 Y 20130117 219.1 3.2 3.4 1 N 
20070105 60.3 5.7 9.9 1 N 20130120 762.0 6.2 6.2 1 Y 
20070108 406.4 3.2 5.0 1 N 20140015 660.4 4.0 4.1 1 Y 
20070110 508.0 4.7 5.0 1 Y 20140017 323.9 1.5 3.0 1 N 
20070116 219.1 5.4 5.8 1 N 20140037 219.1 5.2 5.5 3 N 
20070123 609.6 5.3 5.5 1 N 20140042 457.2 4.5 4.8 1 Y 
20070124 168.3 9.9 10.9 1 Y 20140049 508.0 6.5 6.6 1 N 
20070129 323.9 10.1 11.5 1 Y 20140066 219.1 6.5 6.7 1 N 
20070146 609.6 6.3 8.3 1 N 20140069 609.6 5.7 6.0 1 Y 
20080001 762.0 6.2 6.2 1 Y 20140072 508.0 5.2 6.6 2 Y 
20080003 762.0 6.4 6.4 1 Y 20140073 508.0 3.1 7.8 2 Y 
20080006 609.6 4.2 4.5 1 N 20140082 219.1 5.3 9.1 1 N 
20080008 508.0 5.9 6.9 1 N 20140106 558.8 5.6 5.9 1 N 
20080013 406.4 6.6 7.1 2 Y 20140110 219.1 6.0 6.5 1 N 
Note: RPTIP = Incident report ID; MAOP = Maximum allowable operating pressure; Ig 
= Ignition 
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